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vAbstract
Nowadays there is a tremendous amount of smart and connected devices thatproduce data. The so-called IoT is so pervasive that its devices (in particularthe ones that we take with us during all the day - wearables, smartphones...)
often provide some insights on our lives to third parties. People habitually exchange
some of their private data in order to obtain services, discounts and advantages.
Sharing personal data is commonly accepted in contexts like social networks but
individuals suddenly become more than concerned if a third party is interested in
accessing personal health data. The healthcare systems worldwide, however, begun
to take advantage of the data produced by eHealth solutions. It is clear that while
on one hand the technology proved to be a great ally in the modern medicine and
can lead to notable benefits, on the other hand these processes pose serious threats
to our privacy.
The process of testing, validating and putting on the market a new drug or
medical treatment is called clinical trial. These trials are deeply impacted by the
technological advancements and greatly benefit from the use of eHealth solutions.
The clinical research institutes are the entities in charge of leading the trials and
need to access as much health data of the patients as possible. However, at any phase
of a clinical trial, the personal information of the participants should be preserved
and maintained private as long as possible.
During this thesis, we will introduce an architecture that protects the privacy of
personal data during the first phases of digital clinical trials (namely the charac-
terization phase and the recruiting phase), allowing potential participants to freely
join trials without disclosing their personal health information without a proper
reward and/or prior agreement. We will illustrate what is the trusted environment
that is the most used approach in eHealth and, later, we will dig into the untrusted
environment where the concept of privacy is more challenging to protect while
maintaining usability of data. Our architecture maintains the individuals in full
control over the flow of their personal health data. Moreover, the architecture allows
the clinical research institutes to characterize the population of potentiant users
without direct access to their personal data.
We validated our architecture with a proof of concept that includes all the
involved entities from the low level hardware up to the end application. We designed
and realized the hardware capable of sensing, processing and transmitting personal
health data in a privacy preserving fashion that requires little to none maintenance.
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3Chapter 1
Introduction
During the last two decades we witnessed the tremendous progresses madein the field of wireless sensor networks, from the reduction in size to theenhancement in computation capabilities, from the coverage improvement
to the reduced power consumption and the reduction of hardware costs. These
advancements paved the way and facilitated the wider adoption of small electronic
devices with interconnection capabilities. The so-called Internet of Things (IoT)
is mainly composed by these devices. The IoT is taking a central role into new
generation solutions that orchestrate myriads of devices, web services, business
processes, people, companies and institutions.
The IoT is a highly dynamic and radically distributed networked system, com-
posed of an incredible high number of objects [?]. The ubiquitous and pervasive
devices composing the IoT are sensors, actuators, wireless display, intelligent appli-
aces, and, generally speaking, connected objects. They all generate a tremendous
amount of data [?]. Robust, available and fast infrastructures that also offer storage
solutions capable of handling this flow of data are needed. Moreover, the amount of
this data builds the bases to very effective and powerful algorithms from the fields of
machine learning and data mining [?]. Both IoT and the usage of its data are vastly
considered as ones of the most expanding areas within future technologies and it is
attracting attention in different industry applications [?], ranging from smart cities
to home automation, from farming to precise agriculture, from manufacturing to
healthcare and many more.
In this dissertation, we focused on a particular domain where the coexistence
and cooperation of embedded systems (thus, the IoT) with our social life is unveiling
a brand new era of exciting possibilities, the eHealth (e.g. Figure ??).
Medicine has existed for thousands of years, during most of which it was an
art frequently having connections to the religious and philosophical beliefs of local
culture. In recent centuries, since the advent of modern science, most medicine has
become a combination of art and science. While stitching technique for sutures
is an art learned through practice, the knowledge of what happens at the cellular
and molecular level in the tissues being stitched arises through science. From our
more recent and more ortodox point of view, medicine is the science and practice
of the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease. It encompasses a variety of
health care practices evolved to maintain and restore health by the prevention and
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Figure 1.1. Schematic interconnection of entities involved in eHealth. Icons made by
[prettycons, smashicons, prosymbols, freepik, vectors market] from www.flaticon.com
treatment of illness. Contemporary medicine applies biomedical sciences, biomedical
research, genetics, and medical technology to diagnose, treat, and prevent injury and
disease, typically through pharmaceuticals or surgery, but also through therapies as
diverse as psychotherapy, external splints and traction, medical devices, biologics,
and ionizing radiation, amongst others.
It was only a matter of time before the IoT entered the healthcare world, giving
birth to eHealth. With the constantly increasing amount of data that is inherent to
an IoT world dedicated to the healthcare, all parties involved can benefit. For in-
stance, just to name a few, physicians can obtain better and refined update regarding
a developing disease, hospitals can adjust their beds management in order to react
faster to emergencies, drug developers can potentially access a wealth of real-world,
participant-generated data that is enabling better insights and streamlined clinical
trial processes.
Electronics healthcare solutions and, generally speaking, the Internet of Health
Things (IoHT) follow the same trend as other IoT solutions: they are adopted with
steadily more frequency. About 73% of healthcare executives say that IoHT is a
disrupting techology for the next years and it is already becoming one of the most
funded areas in IoT [?]. In the field of healthcare, common devices that are nowadays
upgraded with connectivity and “smart features” include watches, weights, phones,
clocks and general purpose instrumentation such as pressure monitors. Most of
them are equipped with biometrical sensors or are capable of measuring biological
parameter, such as heart rate, apnea, sleep cycles, body temperature, blood pressure
and oxygenation, body weight, and many more. These devices that gather data
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regarding a specific individual open the way to precision medicine. It aims to adapt
the treatment to the specific individual, thus needs to access as much information
as possible regarding the patient.
Pervasive IoHT enables cost savings for both the administrations and the individuals,
but on the other hand it has some barriers, like privacy and security concerns, lack
of skilled workers, poor interoperability and more [?]. The concepts of “privacy”
and “protection of personal information” are constantly undermined in our society
because of their value and malicious third parties are posing threats. Data breaches
[?, ?, ?] are on the rise and we need techniques to control and protect the users’
privacy in an effective and scalable way.
Given the sensitive nature of healthcare data, there is a strong need to protect
the privacy of the patients from third parties. The European Commission, fur-
thermore, recently enforced the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in
order to strengthen data protection and now this regulation must be applied to any
organisation or individual that collects and processes information related to EU
citizens, regardless where the data is physically stored or where they are based[?, ?].
On the other hand and at the same time, analysis of such data are crucial for both
the medical research and the drug industry. Consequently, there is a need to design
approaches that allow data processing without exposing the personal underlying
information, with a particular focus on the chance of re-identification of individuals
from their data.
All the eHealth processes greatly benefit from accessing as much data as possible.
The privacy preserving approaches require to guarantee privacy to the users and
the techniques involved require an extra effort in terms of computation, energy and
badwidth. This is an obstacle in wearable devices where there are hard constraints
in processing power, communication coverage and bandwidth and energy reserve.
Luckly we will see later how to overcome these limitations.
1.1 Clinical trials
Clinical trials are experiments or observations done in clinical research. Such prospec-
tive biomedical or behavioral research studies on human participants are designed to
answer specific questions about biomedical or behavioral interventions, including new
treatments (such as novel vaccines, drugs, dietary choices, dietary supplements, and
medical devices) and known interventions that warrant further study and comparison.
Clinical trials generate data on safety and efficacy. They are conducted only after
they have received health authority/ethics committee approval in the country where
approval of the therapy is sought. These authorities are responsible for vetting the
risk/benefit ratio of the trial – their approval does not mean that the therapy is
’safe’ or effective, only that the trial may be conducted [?].
Developing drugs is a challenging process. Only around one in 10 drugs in
development actually make it through to the market [?, ?]. This low rate to enter
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the market is one factor contributing to the high costs of drug development and also
the slow adoption of new drugs. A recent study indicates that developing a drug
from bench to market costs an estimated $2.6 billion [?]. A large portion of those
costs is related to:
• recruiting an adequate number of patients
• retaining the patients throughout the trials
Currently, more than 244, 000 studies are registered in the world out of which more
than 42, 000 are currently recruiting [?]. Some of these studies require hundreds of
individuals but others require thousands of participants, each of whom must meet
precise criteria in order to be fit in a particular trial. Thus, it is not surprising that
80% of these important studies are delayed due to recruitment problems, according
to the Center for Information and Study on Clinical Research Participation (CIS-
CRP) [?]. Long recruitment phases prolong the execution of trials thus taking longer
for innovative new medicines to be studied and approved, leaving patients to wait
years for new treatment options.
Depending on product type and development stage, investigators initially enroll
volunteers and/or patients into small pilot studies, and subsequently conduct pro-
gressively larger scale comparative studies. Clinical trials can vary in size and cost,
and they can involve a single research center or multiple centers, in one country or
in multiple countries. Clinical study design aims to ensure the scientific validity and
reproducibility of the results. Trials can be quite costly, depending on a number
of factors. The sponsor may be a governmental organization or a pharmaceutical,
biotechnology or medical device company. Certain functions necessary to the trial,
such as monitoring and lab work, may be managed by an outsourced partner, such
as a contract research organization or a central laboratory.
The clinical trials are affected by a number of uncertainties driven by issues that
could arise during the clinical trial itself. the number of patients required by each
step of a clinical trial need to grow quite exponentially during the process. Enrolled
patients could be less prone to participate if the trial is too cumbersome to sustain
(it may require movements on daily basis to reach a specific installation, or following
too much precautions and guide lines). While there exist trial in which data can be
take remotely (avoiding then the physical movement of patients), often the clinical
research instutions need to verify the reliability of this data. It can be costly and
sometimes not feasible because of the accuracy of the instrumentation (or the cost
of it).
Another aspect to consider is that currently the recruiting of patients is made
by-hand by nurses or, generally, human operators. As in any human relation and
work, this process is prone to errors. This need to access an appropriate pool of
patients in order to execute clinical trials is well known to the broader public. It is
observed on multiple occasions: a growing pool of people willing to participate. In a
2015 study of CISCRP [?] identified that 81% of responders consider clinical research
studies “very important” to the discovery and development of new medicines and
80% of them would be willing to participate in a research study.
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According to a 2012 on-line survey [?], 85% of the responders perceive privacy
concerns as a barrier to share health information. It is clear that collected data may
be used to extract or infer sensitive information about users’ private lives, habits,
activities and relations, which all refer to individuals’ privacy [?, ?]. About half of
the responders were either concerned or very concerned about the re-identification
of their anonymized health and medical information. If data were irreversibly
anonymized, 71% of respondents were willing to share data with researchers. During
a clinical trial recruiting phase, when the benefits of a possible future enrollment
have not been fully clarified, patients expect that their medical condition information
are kept confidential.
Given the strict qualification criteria imposed by the researchers, only about
5% of patients eventually constitute the group participating in clinical trials. It is,
therefore, imperative to introduce new methods for facilitating recruitment that
respects the privacy and confidentiality of the patients in order to maximize the
participation of people - particularly in rare diseases where the communities of
patients are small.
During the execution of the trials, the collection of high-quality data is absolutely
vital. For this reason, trial centres require regular tests and observations to be
conducted at their premises in order to guarantee the accuracy of data collection.
Interestingly, 70% of potential participants live more than two hours away from the
nearest study centre [?]. It is, therefore, common for patients to travel to those
centres for regular tests and observations, sometimes several times each week for the
duration of the trial. Such complexities sometimes overcome the perceived benefits
of participating in a trial, inevitably increasing the attrition rate of patients. Clearly,
redoing patient recruitment further delays the execution of the trials.
Understanding the above issues and addressing them adequately is critical in
developing successful digital health solutions. As technology becomes more accessible
and affordable, the role of digital health data will become vital in clinical trials.
It is well known that smartphones are already a ubiquitous technology – in 2015,
almost two-thirds of people in the U.S. owned a smartphone and almost half owned
a tablet [?]. During the same year, about 300 clinical trials were reported to involve
a wearable technology [?].
The first ever reported clinical trial was conducted by James Lind in 1747 [?],
later on the biggest change in clinical trial was the introduction of randomized
experiments [?, ?, ?, ?]. By the late 20th century, RCTs were recognized as the
standard method for “rational therapeutic” in medicine [?]. To improve the reporting
of RCTs in the medical literature, an international group of scientists and editors
published Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) Statements in
1996, 2001 and 2010, and these have become widely accepted [?, ?].
A randomized controlled trial is a type of scientific experiment which aims to
reduce bias when testing a new treatment. The people participating in the trial are
randomly allocated to either the group receiving the treatment under investigation
or to a group receiving standard treatment (or placebo treatment) as the control.
Randomization minimises selection bias and the different comparison groups allow
the researchers to determine any effects of the treatment when compared with the
no treatment (control) group, while other variables are kept constant. The RCT is
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often considered the gold standard for a clinical trial. RCTs are often used to test
the efficacy or effectiveness of various types of medical intervention and may provide
information about adverse effects, such as drug reactions. Random assignment of
intervention is done after subjects have been assessed for eligibility and recruited,
but before the intervention to be studied begins.
Random allocation in real trials is complex, but conceptually the process is
like tossing a coin. After randomization, the two (or more) groups of subjects are
followed in exactly the same way and the only differences between them is the care
they receive. For example, in terms of procedures, tests, outpatient visits, and
follow-up calls, should be those intrinsic to the treatments being compared. The
most important advantage of proper randomization is that it minimizes allocation
bias, balancing both known and unknown prognostic factors, in the assignment of
treatments [?].
Clinical trials need people to enroll. Participation of possible candidates is one
of the prominent issues. Steve Cutler, chief operating officer of clinical research
organisation ICON says: “Five percent of patients is probably the higher end of the
range for participation in trials. I’d like to see that get to 20% within my lifetime,
and I think we have the opportunity and the potential to get there.” Kevin Julian,
managing director of Accenture adds: “Another exciting development is the ability
to bring specific patient profiles into the recruitment process – not just connecting
patients to trials that they might be interested in but digitally prescreening patients
for the inclusion-exclusion criteria on a trial and learning early on if a patient is
a candidate, or perhaps in a particular population seeing whether there are even
enough patients that meet the criteria. It’s better to know ahead of time than work
it out later by trial and error.”
Many trials do not recruit sufficient participants and this can make it more
difficult to use the results of the research in practice. Effective strategies for im-
proving recruitment would be of great benefit to researchers designing and running
trials [?]. Some groups of individuals are underserved by the medical health-care
system in recruitment for clinical trials, thus it is difficult to include them [?, ?, ?, ?].
Telemedicine helps reaching out more people, as explained in [?, ?]. At the opposite
of the spectrum, instead, there are trials in which the possible participants represent
a very large number. Here we need a way to reduce this set to a smaller one that has
the highest fitting to the trial. A solution was proposed in [?], the authors reduce
the number of participants using electronic screening before recruiting in a clinical
trial.
1.1.1 Phases of a clinical trial
According to [?], a clinical trial of experimental drug, treatment, device or behavioral
intervention may proceed through four phases. To help better understand them, a
graphic is provided in the following Figure ??.
Going deeper, it is necessary to highlight the existence of another base step, the
Phase 0. Finally, we can structurate a clinical trail as a path through five phases
as reported below [?].
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Figure 1.2. Flow diagram to show the different phases in a clinical trial. Icons made by
[prettycons, smashicons, prosymbols, freepik, vectors market] from www.flaticon.com
• Phase 0: the object of the clinical trial (such as a treatment, a device, an
experimental drug or a behavioral intervation) is thoroughly studied. This
phase in particular could be years long.
• Phase I: Clinical Pharmacology and Toxicity. These first experiments are
primarily concerned with drug safety, not efficacy, and hence are usually
performed on human volunteers, often pharmaceutical company employees.
The first objective is to determine an acceptable single drug dosage (i.e. how
much drug can be given without causing serious side-effects). Such information
is often obtained from dose-escalation experiments, whereby a volunteer is
subjected to increasing doses of the drug according to a predetermined schedule.
This phase will also involve studies of drug metabolism and bioavailability.
After studies in normal volunteers, the initial trials in patients will take place.
Typically, the studies in this phase might require a total of around 20-80
subjects and patients.
• Phase II: Initial Clinical Investigation for Treatment Effect. These are fairly
small-scale investigations into the effectiveness and safety of a drug, and require
close monitoring of each patient. The trials in this phase can sometimes be set
up as a screening process to select out those relatively few drugs of genuine
potential from the larger number of drugs which are inactive or over-toxic,
so that the chosen drugs may proceed to the trials in the following phases.
Seldom will this phase go beyond 100-200 patients on a drug.
• Phase III: Full-scale Evaluation of Treatment. After a drug is shown to be
reasonably effective, it is essential to compare it with the current standard
treatment(s) for the same condition in a large trial involving a substantial
number of patients. To some people the term ’clinical trial’ is synonymous with
10 1. Introduction
such a full-scale trial, which is the most rigorous and extensive type of scientific
clinical investigation of a new treatment. Studies investigate the efficacy of the
biomedical or behavioral intervention in large groups of human subjects (from
several hundred to several thousand) by comparing the intervention to other
standard or experimental interventions as well as to monitor adverse effects,
and to collect information that will allow the intervention to be used safely.
• Phase IV: Postmarketing Surveillance. After the research programme leading
to a drug being approved for marketing, there remain substantial enquiries still
to be undertaken as regards monitoring for adverse effects and additional large-
scale, long-term studies of morbidity and mortality. This phase is sometimes
used to describe promotion exercises aimed at bringing a new drug to the
attention of a large number of clinicians, typically in general practice. This
latter type of enquiry has limited scientific value and hence should not be
considered part of clinical trial research.
1.2 Healthcare and IoT, the birth of IoHT
The term eHealth encompasses a broad range of meanings. It is used by many
individuals, institutions and organizations both in academy and outside. Still,
it is a neologism that lacks of a clear definition [?]. Generally speaking, it is a
relatively recent term for healthcare practice supported by electronic processes and
communication [?], we support this definition through our works. Cleared out what
the term means by itself, we can focus on describing what is the eHealth, and what
it changed in the medical field.
Since the beginning of the XXI century [?], different branches of medicine joined
the use of telecommunication and information technology to provide the so-called
telemedicine [?, ?]. With the explosion of the IoT in the market [?], a large number
of devices with internet connectivity started to work among us.
Millions of these devices are sold every year [?], following a trend that does not
seem to diminish. Thus, a vast subset of the world population has access to low
cost devices capable of collecting personal health data, like heart rate, steps, blood
pressure, pulse oximetry, sleep cycles, body weight and composition and much much
more [?].
The tremendous amount of data generated by these devices could be exploited to
help in various field of healthcare, from early diagnosis of illness to more effective
treatment options, from individual-targeted therapies to behavioral analysis. The
advancements in machine learning and data mining techniques can really enhance
the performances of current health solutions as well as exploit the data to provide
cutting edge new paths for treatment and diagnosis. The interest in using advances
in technology in conjuction with medicine is clear [?, ?].
Each aspect of our lives is impacted (or will be impacted in the nearest future),
in particular, regarding the health processes: from the way we wake up each morning
to counting how many steps we made each day, from recording our calory intake
meal after meal to storing our body composition and blood pressure. We were used
to wake up using an alarm clock, then it was the time of the radio alarm clocks,
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now some devices can wake up us at a variable time depending on our sleep stage
[?]. The sphygmomanometer, symbol of modern medicine (with, of course, the
stethoscope) is now often replaced with electronic alternatives that also measure
heart rate in few seconds. A large number of commonly used devices in medicine are
now replaced with more technological alternativse. These newly designed devices try
to minimize reading errors, human mistakes, reliability and offer newer functions and
connectivity. Thinking about the old fashion thermometer that required more than 5
minutes to obtain a reading, is it now normal to image the modern infrared-based or
thermocouple-based alternatives that are extremely faster and easier to read thanks
to the LCD (Liquid Crystal Display). Modern activity trackers can calculate an
incredible range of human body parameters: heart rate, calory burn, pulse oximetry,
steps and also blood pressure.
Remote monitoring of human behaviour and condition is well known in literature
[?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. Telemedicine can be seen as a branch of information technology
that tries to address the issues of medicine coming from distances between patients
and specialized structures, such as costs, time to intervention, diagnosis and more.
Telemedicine helps all the individuals with no distinction between gender, age or
social status.
We live in a society with an increasing number of elder people [?, ?, ?]. As
reported before, the elderly have high need of assistance. This high demand is not
fullfilled completely by the available physician and specialized operators [?, ?, ?, ?].
It is well understood that the elderly are the most vulnerable to illnesses [?, ?] and
studying them throughly could really help the research. The elderly are more prone
to disabilities, so that they could be primary beneficiaries from telemedicine [?].
“Today, the number of elderly people and patients with reduced autonomy or with
chronic diseases are steadily increasing. In addition, a stay in hospital or nursing
home is very expensive. Thus, in recent years we have witnessed the development of
projects to keep these people at home while providing them the needed care and
assistance” [?]. However, it is not new that the interaction between elderly people
and modern technology must be taken into account [?, ?, ?, ?]. Nonetheless, the
research community has made important progresses in that direction [?, ?].
The concept of medical tourism [?] taken a lot of attention from the community
[?, ?, ?]. With the use of eHealth, this phenomenon can be greatly reduced.Moreover,
social status deeply impact the accessibility of individuals to the healthcare system
(both public and private) [?, ?] and it is demonstrated that different educations
lead to the same result [?, ?]. Telemedicine can help on all in all of this matters,
addressing multiple issues together [?, ?, ?, ?].
eHealth technologies are now underway internationally, often with an incredible
high amount of money used as investment. Governments believed in this technology.
For example, England has invested at least 12.8 billion pounds in a National Pro-
gramme for Information Technology (NPfIT) for the National Health Service, while
the the Obama administration in the United States (US) has used more than 37
billion dollars in health care with eHealth[?]. “The eHealth IMPACT study provides
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empirical evidence on the benefits of eHealth systems and services. It demonstrates
the potential of eHealth as enabling tool for meeting the ’grand challenges’ of Eu-
ropean health delivery systems” [?]. Among other solutions, the same concept of
clinical trial could be perfectioned using all the data gathered by the health-centric
IoT devices and the modern machine learning techniques.
1.3 Digital clinical trial
Now it should be clear that the collected data from IoHT devices could improve
the clinical trial process. It can provide advantages in all the steps that involve
the participants, from the recruiting to the enrollment in the program, from the
monitoring during the trial to the share of personal data to third parties. The whole
data, as soon as it is digitalized, become easily accessible and the internet could help
its sharing even further. The strong connection now possible between the clinical
trials and the information technology field paved the way to digital clinical trials. In
this revisited clinical trials, the whole process is supported by recent technologies
that allows to reduce the gap between physicians and patients and between clinical
research institutions. Moreover, it can particularly help in all the situations in which
the physical distances between the clinical research institutes and the patients are
considered strong barriers. In these cases, telemedice and eHealth solutions can
be the only feasible options for a person to participate in a trial (e.g. if he/she
is mobility impaired or reaching the clinical research institution requires taking
multiple transportation systems). The wide adoption of technology changes the way
each phase of a clinical trail is accomplished.
Figure 1.3. The generic iterative phase suggested in digital clinical trials. Icons made by
[prettycons, smashicons, prosymbols, freepik, vectors market] from www.flaticon.com
At first, all but the Phase 0 depicted in Figure ?? are deeply affected by the
use of health-related IoT devices. Since we are now in a faster communicating
1.4 eHealth and privacy 13
environment, it is possible to adjust requirements, steps to follow, control parameter
and much more at any time. Thus, these phases can be made iterative. This
particular approach poses the bases for the digital clinical trial, of which each phase
could follow the iteration presented in Figure ??.
The model is based on the ability of modern technologies to communicate over
the Internet in order to reach nearly an unlimited number of potential participants.
The model also leverages the capabilities of IoT to collect relevant data for a specific
study employing suitable devices deployed outside the “study centres”, possibly at
participants’ homes. Initially, a digital clinical trial is designed, possibly taking into
account insights from previous trials. In the sequel, during the recruiting phase,
patients matching the needs for the designed trial are recruited. These patients are
required to enrol upon accepting the informed consent. Enrolled patients remotely
collect useful data and share those data to build a knowledge bank. The
outcomes of the trial are disseminated and can contribute to the design of a new
trial. The cycle then can repeat itself several times, possibly improving each phase.
The advantages are obvious, it is possible to better target a specific group of people
as well as reach previously unreachable individuals, also it is possible to change
parameter on-the-fly and have access to much more information then before, also in
a real-time fashion. Moreover, all the data is digitized. This implies that is easier to
share. Also the results accomplished by different organizations are fastly available,
and this makes the refining iterative process simpler and faster.
1.4 eHealth and privacy
Digitalization of clinical trials poses some interrogatives to answer to. How is my
data managed? Who is in charge of controlling the flow of information and how he
can guarantee no data breaches? Privacy must be really taken into account by both
possible candidates and third parties. This matter is well-known in the literature
[?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. The motives are different but they require strong answers to address
the matter and make the potential candidates comfortable to participate without
fears. Privacy of information collected during healthcare processes is necessary
because of significant economic, psychologic, and social harm that can come to
individuals when personal health information is disclosed [?, ?].
Privacy of information collected during healthcare processes is necessary because
of significant economic, psychologic, and social harm that can come to individuals
when personal health information is disclosed [?, ?]. Multiple definitions of privacy
exist, each one focused on different declinations of the same principle: “the ones
right to manage valuable personal information”. Certain studies account some
critical points regarding privacy: improper access, unauthorized use (both direct or
secondary), errors and collection of personal information [?, ?, ?, ?].
Consider the following three different definitions of privacy that help convey the
implication of the concept of privacy within IT applications and services [?]:
• "Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for
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themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is commu-
nicated to others.” [?]
• "[Privacy is] the appropriate use of personal information under the circum-
stances. What is appropriate will depend on context, law, and the individual’s
expectations; also, [privacy is] the right of an individual to control the collection,
use, and disclosure of personal information.” [?]
• "Privacy involves the policies, procedures, and other controls that determine
which personal information is collected, how it is used, with whom it is shared,
and how individuals who are the subject of that information are informed and
involved in this process.” [?]
The above definitions indicate that privacy includes diverse concepts however
they all accept the emerging need to manage and protect the personal information
adequately. Essentially the goal of information privacy raises issues of access control
(user authentication and authorization) and the need for data authentication.
Accordingly, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) believes that a privacy
policy for health information should be based on the following principles [?, ?]:
1. Strict limits on access and disclosure must apply to all personally identifiable
health data, regardless of the form in which the information is maintained.
2. All personally identifiable health records must be under an individual’s control.
No personal information may be disclosed without an individual’s uncoerced,
informed consent.
3. Health-record information systems must be required to build in security mea-
sures to protect personal information against both unauthorized access and
misuse by authorized users.
4. Employers must be denied access to personally identifiable health information
on their employees and prospective employees.
5. Patients must be given notice of all uses of their health information.
6. Individuals must have a right of access to their own medical and financial
records, including rights to copy and correct any and all information contained
in those records.
7. Both a private right of action and a governmental enforcement mechanism
must be established to prevent or remedy wrongful disclosures or other misuses
of information.
8. A federal oversight system must be established to ensure compliance with
privacy laws and regulations.
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1.4.1 Privacy and security
In a digital health system, all information is converted into a digital form. Therefore
data protection and privacy protection are very closely connected. This is due to
the need of transmitting, processing and utilizing the information in fast, simple and
reliable ways, thus in digital ways. It is, therefore, crucial to agree on a common
definition of privacy, how it is related to security and how to identify and address
privacy risks.
In terms of a healthcare information security system, the goals of the system in
terms of security can be simply stated as follows [?, ?, ?].
1. To ensure the privacy of patients and the confidentiality of health care data
(prevention of unauthorized disclosure of information).
2. To ensure the integrity of healthcare data (prevention of unauthorized modifi-
cation of information).
3. To ensure the availability of health data for authorized persons (prevention of
unauthorized or unintended withholding of information or resources).
In this sense, the goal of security is the application of cryptographic protocols
for data transmission and storage.
1.4.2 The role of trust
Online users show privacy concerns about the usage, the disclosure and the protection
of their personal health information [?]. Moreover, they are also sensitive to the
possible further dissemination of their personal health information. The research is
well aware of the concern of privacy about the health information of individuals [?,
?, ?, ?, ?]. Among all the different types of personal and sensible information, a
prominent place is occupied by the medical and clinical data. Among online users,
is understood that exist a concrete concern regarding the usage, the disclosure, and
the control that they have on their personal health information [?]. These pool
of users are sensible also to the fact that it is possible that undesirable social and
economic consequences can happen following a misuse of such data [?]. As part of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), introduced in
1996, a huge step in the handling and protection of sensible health information was
made and also it brought to the forefront some privacy concerns [?].
These studies indicate that the lack of trust in ICTs and digital health care affects
very seriously any effort to migrate from the conventional healthcare procedures to
an electronic system. Trust has been the fundamental pre-requisite for the progress
of commerce and prosperity in human societies [?]. The “trust” can be explained as
the acceptation to depend on a third party (another person, institution, company,
or other) based only on the belief of its integrity and/or benevolence [?, ?, ?]. Since
trust determines to which extent an individual wants to depend on others, it is also a
primary factor in changes in behaviour [?] and helps understand others’ motives and
social interactions [?, ?]. The central role of trust as a major type of social capital
in online activities is well established [?, ?, ?]. Research on traditional business
interactions has demonstrated the significant role of trust [?, ?, ?, ?], moreover
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the research on online purchasing activities has shown its the critical role in online
business transactions [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. The central role of trust in electronic
commerce has been demonstrated multiple times [?]. The challenge of trust in a
digital environment is the strong separation between how people perceive a potential
danger and how people understand it [?, ?].
According to the above, any successful digital healthcare system should target
at increasing citizen’s trust. It is clear that both trust and security play central
and fundamental roles: “The more people trust others, the less concern they have
for misuse of personal information” [?]. Trust, however, is difficult to establish in
the digital health domain since it requires interactions between computers, between
humans, and between humans and computers.
There is much ongoing the development of new trust management models for
complex and dependable computer systems. As privacy is connected to security,
a similar relationship is also observed between trust and security [?]. Researchers
propose the application of automated trust mechanisms in distributed systems [?].
Various schemes have been proposed for the design of secure information systems
have been proposed which are based on automated trust management protocols [?,
?, ?]. The composition and propagation of trust information between elements of
information systems are also of pivotal concern and a number of research works are
devoted to them [?, ?, ?, ?].
1.4.3 Data protection regulations
The need for protecting individuals’ privacy has been recognized by the law enforce-
ment agencies leading to the creation of laws for data protection. A new European
Union-wide framework known as the General Data Protection Regulation1 (GDPR)
has been introduced that provides a more uniform interpretation and application of
data protection standards across the EU. Essentially it constitutes a fundamental
change in the management of data privacy designed to protect and empower all EU
citizens data privacy and with severe implications in the way organizations across
EU approach data privacy. While the purpose of GDPR is to protect personal data
at large, namely “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person”, in this dissertation the focus is on clinical trial data as they necessarily
require the collection and analysis of sensitive personal data (e.g. health data).
The regulatory framework defines three main roles: The Subject, namely the
resident or individual providing his/her data to the organization for the purpose
of the clinical trial. The Data Controller, namely the clinical research institute
that determines the purpose and meaning of the processing (i.e., the clinical trial) of
personal data provided by the subjects. The Data Processor that processes the
personal data on behalf of the Data Controller. Note that in many cases the clinical
research institute has the double role of Data controller and Data Processor. The
following is a short summary of the main requirements defined in the law enforcement
directive:
• Explicit Consent. Clear and definite conditions for acquiring consent from
1https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/
data-protection/2018-reform-eu-data-protection-rules_en
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data subjects (citizens) to process data;
• Data Protection Officer. A person is appointed to handle the necessary
internal recordkeeping requirements;
• Sanctions. Non-compliance can result in serious penalties;
• Territorial Scope. The directive applies to all organizations processing
data from data subjects (citizens) residing in the EU, not only EU based
organizations;
• Right to Access. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the
controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or
her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal
data and some other information;
• Right to rectification. Incorrect data has to be rectified;
• Right to be Forgotten. Data subjects have the right to request data
controllers to erase their data;
• Data Portability. Data subjects have the right to request their data in a
portable format, which allows one to transfer its data to another data controller;
• Data Protection by Design and by Default. Develop default privacy
protection mechanisms and implement monitoring processes;
• Notification Requirements. Data breaches must be reported without undue
delay.
Clinical trial data is, however, a “special” data category whereby processing is
necessary for scientific or research purposes. This special data category negates
the subject’s right to erasure or portability. This is due to the fact that clinical
data cannot just be removed or transferred from a dataset, without affecting the
audit trail or the statistical outcome. Subjects can, however, leave a trial to prevent
additional data collection.
In this context, the right of data portability means that clinical trial subjects have
the right to receive their personal data in a commonly used and machine-readable
format, and transmit such data to another organization.
Clinical trial providers must identify the data that is being processed, where it
is transferred to, who processes the data, what it used for, any risks and processes,
and ensure all employees are trained. Furthermore, they have to provide all these
information to potential participants in a trial and keep records to show what
individuals have consented to, what they were told, and when and how they consented.
Note that, a clinical trial provider is a processor from a customer perspective but
also a controller of data in terms of personnel, sales, and sub-contractors. As a
consequence, clinical trial companies have obligations to make sure that rules are in
place and followed.
Particular interest is article 32 of the directive that states that “the controller and
the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to
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ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk”. To this purpose, a crucial compo-
nent of data collection in clinical trials is the distinction between pseudonymization
and anonymization. Any pseudonymized data that can still be tied to an individual
patient with the help of other information will still be considered personally identi-
fying information (PII). Only fully anonymized data will lose the PII label, so trials
must make the distinction between these two data types in trial protocols.
During this dissertation we will focus also on the technical implications of the
Article 32 in the context of clinical trials when IoT devices are employed at home to
collect relevant health and personal data for the trial.
1.5 State of the art
From the study in [?], it is clear that IoT will soon revolutionize the healthcare
system that is transforming itself exploiting the potentialities of IoT. While on one
hand the Internet of Healthcare Things (IoHT) technology offers ridiculous benefits,
on the other poses new challenges. The work in [?] validates the effectiveness in
using IoT devices in the following of diabetes outpatients. In [?] it is recognize that
current personal health data is prone to hacking because of security vulnerabilities.
In [?, ?] the authors propose social media based approaches to make the people
aware of clinical trials. These solutions greatly reduce the cost of advertising (often
done through other media, like newspapers, television and radio) but do not help
in characterizing the population before the actual recruitment. Anyway, exploiting
social network allow to reach a really wide audience with ease. To overcome the
difficulties in recruiting adolescents (in particular girls), the authors in [?] propose a
mixed approach of social media use (Facebook) with the traditional paper mailing.
This approach is interesting because firstly tries to attract interested adolescents
using a technology well-known to them (the social media), then, in a second phase, it
uses the traditional paper mailing to communicate further. The inclusion of people
over 90 years old is of particular interest in clinical research, in fact they compose
the fastest growing segment of the population [?]. In the 90+ study analyzed in the
same work [?], one of the inclusion criteria for the study was that the individuals
must be within one hour drive from the study location. This limit can be (partially)
overcome using remote monitoring system or similar solutions offered by eHealth.
The authors in [?] applied the MARKIT (Marketing and Information Technology)
model to the SMART study (a clinical trial of weight loss for college students). Some
of the subjects in the SMART study were monitored using IoHT devices. In the
work [?] all the data is collected within a single system, where study staff can
monitor, for example, the completion of questionnaires and more. The authors in
[?] propose a high level view of their architecture to efficiently use wearables IoT in
healthcare. From their study also emerge the need for standards and regulations.
The work in [?] propose the submission of online personality questionnaires in order
to increase the efficiency of recruitment. This additional step helps to identify the
potential participants who will meet the key criteria. The authors in [?] propose an
architecture to collect and process health data produced by specialized IoT devices.
Their approach uses a centralized structure with an added privacy preserving and
security enforcement module at the edges. They do not dive, however, into the
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recruiting process of digital clinical trials. The article in [?] highlights the importance
of wearables devices in both recruiting participants for digital clinical trial and the
successive follow up (in following strict treatments but also in the long run).
The introduction of blockchain technology to healthcare is not completely new
in the field, for example in [?] the authors propose a platform to conduct trial and
better support precision medicine. It is crucial to keep in mind that smart wearables
integrate sensing, computation and wireless communication in small, low-power
devices that in many cases may operate in uncontrolled environments. Such low-
sized embedded devices have limited sensing, signal processing, and communication
capabilities and are usually battery operated. Due to this resource-constrained
environment of operation, applying standard security and privacy requirements
is extremely challenging [?]. As an example consider that some smart devices
have limited computing and storage capabilities, thus cryptographic algorithms and
protocols that require intensive computation, communication, or storage are simply
not applicable. It is too costly (in terms of computation) to authenticate using a
public key and too costly (in terms of memory and computation) to store one-way
chains of keys. Also consider that some smart devices may be battery operated,
forcing security mechanisms to reduce their energy consumption. These constraints
greatly increase the difficulty of securing IoT-enabled systems and make them more
vulnerable to security threats [?, ?, ?].
1.6 Data management in trusted space
A common approach to address the requirements and technical challenges outlined in
the previous sections is to introduce a centralised, cloud-based trusted authority that
is responsible for the control and processing of the data of the clinical trials. The data
collected by the IoT devices at home during the different phases of a clinical trial
depicted in Figure ?? are shared with this trusted authority that controls and stores
them on a cloud-based infrastructure. In this way, existing commercial platforms
(e.g., such as AWS IoT2) can be used to accelerate the development process and
integrate existing business processes and IT enterprise infrastructures to enrich the
delivered services.
Three main spaces are identified: the private space, the trusted space and the
public one. During all the phases of the clinical trial, the data in the private space
generated by the IoT devices, is enriched by other relevant data possibly residing
in the public space, such as gender, sex, age etc. and delivered to the trusted space.
The Clinical Research Institute is operating within the trusted space in order to
analyze the data as an integral part of the research. It is evident that the user has
severely limited control over the personal data residing within the trusted space. It
is therefore critical that the trusted space conforms to all regulations relevant to
data protection. For this reason, the Data Controller and the Data Processor take
care to anonymize or pseudonymize the data residing within the trusted space in
order to be compliant with Article 32 of the GDPR. For a graphical representation
see Figure ??.
2https://aws.amazon.com/iot/
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Figure 1.4. A simplified representation of the common approach in which according to
Article 32 of GDPR anonymization and/or pseudoanonymization are in charge of the
Data Processor and Data Controller.
In the following, three techniques that can be employed to guarantee the
anonymization or pseudonymization of personal data collected will be analyzed.
Remark that there is an evident trade-off between the privacy that can be guaran-
teed to the participant and the usefulness of the data for the purposes of the clinical
trial; as much the data are handled to preserve the privacy of the participant, as
more difficult it becomes to extract relevant information to be used in the clinical
trial. Note that the data in the public space are among the “other information” that
can be used to tie pseudo-anonymized data to an individual patient, thus voiding
the anonymization process.
1.6.1 K-anonymity
K-anonymity is a practical approach for data anonymization. The key idea of
k-anonimity is that the features that would allow the identification of users are
handled such that always exist at least k records in the dataset with the same set of
features, so in principle is difficult for an adversary to distinguish among those k
records. To clarify this concept, consider the example in Table ??. In this example,
the adversary knows some information about the users, namely name, age and ZIP.
If the adversary can have access to the medical records, despite they do not contain
the name of the users, he can immediately correlate this information with the ones in
his availability, to infer sensitive information about the disease of the users. Through
k-anonimity (2-anonimity in this case) this risk can be reduced. Indeed with his
information the adversary can claim that either Joe or Nic have disease A (or B),
but not exactly who.
There is a clear trade-off between the re-identification probability that can be
tolerated and the utility of data; while higher values of k imply a lower probability
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Name Age ZIP
Joe 15 1
Nic 18 2
Lou 35 3
Mary 40 4
Age ZIP Disease
15 1 A
18 2 B
35 3 C
40 4 D
Age ZIP Disease
[15,18] [1,2] A
[15,18] [1,2] B
[35,40] [3,4] C
[35,40] [3,4] D
Table 1.1. On the right the adversary’s knowledge, in the center the original medical
records which, on the left a 2-anonymous table.
of re-identification, they also introduce more distortion to the data, in some cases
reducing significantly the usefulness of the data. [?] provides a survey on k-anonymity
in data mining while [?] explores the applicability of k-anonimity to health records.
In the latter, the authors suggest that a hypothesis testing approach can be effectively
used to control over re-identification risk and to reduce the extent of information
loss compared to baseline k-anonymity.
1.6.2 l-diversity
In [?] the authors show two simple attacks to a k-anonymized dataset that can lead
to severe privacy problems. The homogeneity attack, exploits the limited diversity
in some sensitive attributes. In particular, if the value for a sensitive attribute
within a group of k records is the same, that value can be predicted exactly even
in a k-anonymized dataset. As an example of homogeneity attack, consider the
case in table ?? where the Disease is C for both the records in the group with Age
[35,40] and ZIP [3,4]. The background knowledge attack relies on some background
knowledge that is possibly not encoded in the dataset, but allows the attacker to
infer the most likely values for some attributes. To overcome the homogeneity attack,
the most simple definition of l-diversity [?] requires that the records in a group shows
at least l distinct values.
1.6.3 Differential Privacy
The main purpose of differential-privacy [?] is to make indistinguishable the output
of an algorithm that analyzes a dataset and computes statistics, when a record in
the dataset is either present or absent. In other words, looking at the output of the
algorithm, one cannot tell whether any individual’s data was included in the original
dataset or not. This implies, that an adversary cannot learn anything (w.h.p.) about
the presence or absence of that particular user, irrespectively from the peculiar
characteristics of that user.
More formally, given a randomized algorithm A and two datasets D1 and D2
that differs in exactly one record (i.e., the data of one person), A is -differential
private if for any S ⊆ Range(A)
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[A(D2) ∈ S]
The architecture of a differential privacy system [?] is represented in Figure ??.
The analyst submit a query to the privacy guard, a software that assesses the privacy
impact of the query “using a special algorithm”. The query is delivered to the
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database that responds. The guard adds some “noise” according to the evaluation
of the privacy impact and the noisy rensponse is finally delivered to the analyst.
Figure 1.5. A simplified reference architecture
The correct evaluation of the privacy impact is crucial in this process and it
is primarely related to the selection of the parameter , which is the parameter
controlling the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy. While this is one among the
most critical aspect for the applicability of differential privacy in practical cases, to
the best of our knowledge, there is still no rigorous method to evaluate it in the
literature. Dwork [?] indicates that the value of  is a “social question”, leaving
de-facto open the problem, while in [?] the authors discuss the challenge of setting
the proper value of  given the goal of protecting individuals in the database with
some fixed probability; they show that the clues about the fact that a specific
individual is in the database or not can change depending on the query, the values
in the data, and even on values not in the data. More recently, the authors of [?]
proposed a model that expresses the balance between privacy and accuracy and
they used such model to choose  on a series of simple statistical studies. Despite
such efforts, still a satisfactory evaluation of  is a challenge and make difficult the
applicability of differential privacy in practice. Indeed, in the literature the value of
 can range from 0.01 to more than 5. Finally, [?] analyses the main criticism about
differential privacy.
The paper [?] discusses the applicability of differential privacy to the health
care domain. While the motivations supporting the use of differential privacy
and the corresponding challenges are very well explored, unfortunately the actual
application of this techinque in real world helath care is very limited. Very recently,
the paper [?] has promised a step forward towards practical differential privacy for
SQL queries. The authors implemented FLEX, a tool to enforce differential privacy
for real-world SQL queries on any existing database with negligible performance
overhead. Remarkably, the approach has been recently adopted by Uber to enforce
differential privacy for their internal data analytics 3.
3https://medium.com/uber-security-privacy/differential-privacy-open-source-7892c82c42b6
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1.7 Challenges of IoHT-generated data
Today, multiple IoT devices for healthcare (namely IoHT ) are available, from the
professional infusion pumps and ventilators to the smartwatches, from portable blood
analyzers to mobile EKG units and much more. The clinical research institutes expect
that these devices will meet certain requirements, thus they provide useful data.
From the work in [?] it is clear that IoT-generated data must retain some properties
such as accuracy, freshness, availability and so on. The successful integration of
IoT technologies in healthcare requires to address very specific technical challenges.
For example, a clinical research institute that conducts a digital clinical trial needs
to guarantee certain technical requirements throughout the complete process (see
Figure ??), from specifying the desired patient profiles and the digital screening
process up to the collection of data and conducting the analysis.
Our architecture, that will be introduced starting from Chapter ??, retains some
of the following data properties in digital clinical trials. It also guarantees privacy
protection to the individual and it assures quality of data to the clinical research
institute, at least during the first phases (see Figure ??) of a digital clinical trial
where both the users and the clinical research institutes are most vulnerable. We
want to protect the interests of business parties (like the clinical research institutes)
while guaranteeing as much privacy as possible to the users. Out architecture
provides a method that allows the CRIs to track the data generated, validating the
authenticity of the devices and retrieveing their accuracy. Since the same architecture
uses encrypted communication channels and storage solutions, it can assure the
confidentiality of data to the users. The hashing of data is used, instead, to validate
the integrity of gathered data. During the first phases of the trial, users’ data remain
into their respective private spaces, thus our architecture should not leverage online
cloud storage solutions to increase data availability. Still, during the first phases,
data is not provided directly to the CRIs thus we can not guarantee freshness of data.
Anyway, we timestamp all the information in a secure and reliable way (leveraging
the blockchain technology) so that the CRIs can check for it in the next phases when,
instead, we use IoHT devices to send data possibly guaranteeing also freshness.
In the sequel, the most critical technical challenges related to the acquisition,
storage and processing of data are presented, with a focus on eHealth applications.
Despite in our architecture we relax the concepts of freshness and availability of
data, we report them in the following for sake of completeness.
1.7.1 Accuracy
The term accuracy itself may refer to the closeness between an accepted reference
value and the test result [?]. A measurement, instead, is described by its trueness
and precision. To better explain the concepts, trueness represents the closeness
between an accepted reference value and the average of a large number of tests [?].
The trueness itself is affected by the systematic error that is a value that shifts
all measurements in a systematic way [?]. Contrary with respect to the systematic
error, there is the random error that affects mainly precision and can vary in an
unpredictable way. This kind of error occurs for a plethora of reasons, like noise in
the measurements or a too small sample size. Finally, precision is not related to the
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true absolute value but refers to the closeness between test results [?].
At an abstract level, a sensor is an electronic component that converts a physical
value (such as O2 in the air, light and temperature within a room, etc.) to an
electronic form, digital or analogic. More advanced sensors, instead, apply particular
algorithms on top of raw data to obtain data. Examples of these sensors are the
optical heart rate and pulse oximetry sensors that rely on an optical sensor varying
its value, or various blood analysis that use chromatography to retrieve components’
concentrations.
Heart rate, the glucose level in the blood, number of steps made per hour, daily
calories intake and much more are examples of information that can be gathered
from IoT devices. Like any other information, they have a certain accuracy that
characterizes the data [?]. For example, it was studied [?] that heart rate monitoring
made by common activity trackers and smartwatches have accuracies that range from
99.9% to 92.8% and, thus, in certain scenarios they can be treated as accurate. In
[?, ?], the authors measured the performances of a very common activity band with
respect to professional calorimeters. While during activities made on plane surfaces
the accuracy was relatively high (> 80%), a slight inclination change produced a
notable worsening in performances, achieving a poor evaluation of burnt calories
with accuracy degrading by more than 40%.
Another interesting aspect is that accuracies of different parameters can vary
deeply depending on sensor positioning. As an example, sensors positioned on the
wrist, on the chest or on the hip achieve different accuracy [?].
1.7.2 Authenticity
Data may be collected from high-quality, high-accuracy equipment targeting profes-
sional uses or from low-cost, low-accuracy devices suitable for recreational activities.
Remote patient monitoring requires the use of equipment that provides a constant
and measurable performance so that the experts can evaluate correctly the health
status of the patient. It is therefore required to establish an authentication method
in order to verify the source of data and avoid fake or data of poor accuracy. A
typical example could be the assumption of opiates drugs, that cause dependence [?].
A patient is willing to fake data in order to receive stronger medications or additional
doses of the same drug but for a longer period of time. Another example could be
the faking of data coming from a smart scale in order to benefit from incentives [?].
These examples demonstrate the need for an authentication method for all the IoT
devices that participate in a digital clinical trial.
A consistent number of works in the literature provide primitives for authentica-
tion in low power systems and, in general, in IoT devices. For example a two-way
authentication system based on Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) pro-
tocol could serve [?], or an authentication and access control framework based on
CoAP [?]. Certificate-based authentication mechanism for WSNs can also be used
in order to allow the sensor nodes and the end-users to authenticate each other and
initiate secure connections [?].
It is equally important to take into account the reputation of the devices in order
to detect promptly attacks, malicious behaviours or tamperings. Towards this end a
trust management model based on fuzzy reputation for IoT can address this issue [?].
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The problem is well studied in a broader context, for example the case of a Social
IoT (SIoT) [?].
1.7.3 Confidentiality
Personal health information is perceived as one of the most important data to protect
from third parties. As already stated in [?], 85% of the respondents perceive privacy
concerns as a barrier to share health information and it is clear that the individuals
request a high standard of confidentiality. While some years ago IoT devices were
usually constrained in terms of processing power and memory [?], new devices take
advantage of the technological advancements in the silicon industry that offer high
processing power with little energy consumption. The new capabilities of embedded
processors and microcontrollrs allow advanced algorithms to be executed within the
IoT device [?, ?, ?, ?].
Data confidentiality is mostly achieved through encryption, using an algorithm
such as AES, DES or RSA [?]. These algorithms are highly optimized and represent
a mature technology, but often they require some processing power (it depends
also on the parameters for encryption and the strongness willing to achieve) [?]. It
is important to highlight that, in order to assure confidentiality, some encryption
algorithms require to successfully realize a key exchange before opening a secure
communication channel [?, ?].
One of the most used silicon architecture in small devices is the ARM Cortex-M.
Within these Integrated Circuits (IC), it is common to find hardware accelerators for
a security application, most notably the AES accelerator [?]. Running encryption
algorithms in hardware allows very constrained devices, like activity trackers, smart
wearables but also RFID tags [?] to communicate confidentially, guaranteeing high
levels of security.
1.7.4 Freshness
Depending on the particular clinical trial scenario, data need to be processed and
evaluated within certain delay requirements. In trials targetting wellness and safety,
delay is a critical requirement. For example for heart diseases such as arrythmia,
identifying and generating early warnings require very short response times [?, ?].
In other applications the freshness requirement can be relaxed regarding slowly
changing parameters. For example, the glucose level in the blood can be delayed by
minutes since it changes relatively slowly [?].
A critical aspect of existing IoT devices targeting healthcare is their lack of
computational power to locally process the ECG recordings and detect abnormal
behaviour. Therefore recorded signals need to be transfered to cloud services where
advanced analysis algorithms are executed for processing and Integrated [?, ?]. In
a typical IoT architectures, data flows from the IoT devices are transmitted to a
nearby gateway device and then to cloud services for further processing, analysis
and integration [?]. In such a typical IoT deployment, there are several technical
issues that need to be addressed in order to guarantee any freshness requirements
imposed by the specific clinical trial. Depending on the sensor used, in certain cases
even a trace of a short period can require large amounts of data to be transmitted
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over the wireless network and eventually to the core network. Considering that data
flows can follow different paths, in particular beyond the local gateway and within
the core network infrastructure, it is natural to encounter delays, during disassembly
and reassembly, as well as jitter in the communication [?, ?].
Another technical issue relates to dense deployments of IoT devices within small
areas where a very large number of devices communicate continuously with the
gateway. Despite that each sensor may transmit a potentially small quantity of data,
the total number of data flows deeply stress current communication protocols that
rely on medium contention (e.g., CSMA - Carrier Sense Multiple Access) such as
Wi-Fi 802.11 and ZigBee 802.15.4 [?] to cite the most common ones. This issue
could cause loss of data due to buffer overloading (particularly true on constrained
devices) and to delays [?].
It is also important to consider that wireless comunication are also susceptible to
cyber attacks like jamming [?, ?]. In such cases, the frequencies used to enable the
communications are saturated with noise, making the medium unusable. Various
techniques were proposed to limit this issue, between the most notable one, there is
the spread spectrum with its declinations [?, ?]. It is evident that minimal possible la-
tency, network bandwidth preservation, and efficient data storage resource utilization
are elements of paramount importance to address the freshness requirement [?].
Recently, researchers have examined the possibility of allowing IoT devices to
become capable of executing advanced alerting algorithms locally. In this alternative
IoT architecture, segments of sensor data are classified wether they are important or
not for the clinical trial and thus if they should be stored and transmitted to the cloud
infrastructure. In this way the overall data traffic is minimized while additionally
the IoT device would conserve battery power and minimize memory requirements.
This concept of combining the resource-bound last-mile sensors of any IoT-related
application with computational capabilities is receiving increasing attention from
researchers and practictioners. The so-called Fog computing approach extends the
cloud computing paradigm by migrating data processing closer to production site,
accelerates system responsiveness to events along with its overall awareness, by
eliminating the data round-trip to the cloud. Offloading large datasets to the core
network is no longer a necessity, consequently leading to improved resource utilization
and quality of experience (QoE) [?]. Another very important benefit of the Fog
computing approach is the increased level of data control. Since the data collected
from the wearable devices is not forwarded to the cloud, we are in the position
to allow the user to maintain control of all collected data. In other words, Fog
computing reinforces our goal of guaranteeing the privacy of confidential data, which
is of paramount importance when designing smart healthcare systems.
Apart from the particular approach to address the freshness requirement, it
is critical that data generated by the IoT device is timestamped. In this way,
potentially dangerous situations can be avoided [?]. Sensor that assess the sleeping
patterns of individuals that do not incorporate accurate timestamps can easily lead
to naive miscalculations of the time spent in the bed. Addressing this requirement
requires that IoT devices are equipped with accurate clocks that are periodically
synchronized.
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1.7.5 Availability
The role of IoT devices is to collect data that will be used in the clinical trial.
As soon as the physical phenomenon is sampled by the sensor, it is stored locally.
Moreover, under the Fog Computing paradigm the data is analyzed locally. Therefore
data availability depends on both the connection, storage and processing technical
approach followed.
Data storage follows two main paradigms: centralized and decentralized. In
centralized solutions, a single entity, such as a server or generally a device, stores all
the data. While this can be convenient in terms of cost, resources need and more, it
also makes the system less robust against hardware failures and power outages. In
fact, a centralized system has a single point of failure. On the contrary, decentralized
solutions allow for better scalability, do not suffer from the single point of failure
and is robust also against large-scale power outages.
In IoT applications it is common to find locally centralized systems [?, ?, ?, ?, ?]
that send data to the cloud periodically, where the storage solutions are mostly
decentralized [?, ?, ?, ?]. This hybrid approach present some strengths like the
simplicity of installation, maintenance and connection since a single device that acts
as a gateway should be configured and connected to the internet but at the same
time suffers from the single point of failure and power outages.
During recent years, we witness the increasing usage and development of low
power, long range and low-cost radios that paved the way for local-infrastructure-
independent devices [?, ?]. In most cases, communication infrastructures such as
LoRaWAN [?, ?, ?, ?] and SigFox [?, ?] allows the usage of IoT devices without the
need for a gateway. The main limits of such architectures are the offered bandwidth
[?] that is limited and their cost. In [?, ?], the authors investigate the limits of the
PHY and MAC layer of SigFox and LoRa protocols. The real-time capabilities of such
protocols are limited so that applications that require tight real-time communication
or require high bandwidth are very limited. At last, it is important to highlight that
the solution proposed by SigFox is strongly limited on the downlink communication
(from the cloud to the devices) allowing only a few packets per day to be delivered.
Availability is also influenced by the amount of energy available on the specific
IoT device. Clearly, for devices connected to the main supply, this is not an issue,
but the vast majority of IoT devices used in healthcare (such as smart bands,
activity trackers, smart watches but also smart scales, blood pressure monitors, pulse
oximetry meters and so on) are powered through batteries. Despite the very fast
improving in silicon technologies, batteries are not following the same trend and
improve their capacity of about 5% - 8% every year [?]. Moreover, lithium-based
batteries are not considered strongly safe, as demonstrated by the very flourish
research activity [?, ?, ?] that try to avoid dangerous explosions and thermal runaway
typical of this kind of batteries.
Battery depletion causes unavailability, thus the research is trying to address the
issue with multiple approaches, from designing low power algorithms to changing in
network topologies to implementing newer and more energy efficient hardware. For
example, in [?], the authors present a low-power system for acquiring and classify
biosignal coming from body sensors, while in [?] a mechanism is presented to adapt
the radio power in order to decrease the overall energy consumption. In [?] the
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authors present a lightweight multicast forwarding for service discovery and in [?] the
other authors describe how to optimize power consumption using BLE (Bluetooth
Low Energy) technology.
1.7.6 Integrity
Wireless communication technologies used in IoT, such as ZigBee [?, ?], LoRa [?, ?]
and SigFox [?, ?] do not offer packet fragmentation. This impacts all the IoT
applications where data that need to be transfered cannot fit within a single packet
size. For example, LoRa allows a maximum packet size of 256 bytes, ZigBee of
133 bytes, while SigFox allows only 12 bytes for upstream packets and 8 bytes for
downstream packets. These sizes do not reflect the actual payload of the packets,
they often include the header and sometimes also the preamble. It is evident that
IoT devices must implement data fragmentation mechanism. Such mechanisms must
guarantee the integrity of information during data reassembling.
Interestingly, data fragmentation is not the only threat to integrity. Data
integrity is strongly connected to the concept of protection of information from
possibly malicious third parties, cybercriminals or any external interference from
the initial transmission to the final reception of data. Thus, the system must be
aware of the threat whenever it tries to tamper the data [?]. Malicious third parties
could be interested in making revenue for their false outsourced data. A solution
for such problem is, for example, investigated in [?], where the authors provided
an analysis on data integrity verification based on authenticator suitable for both
the cloud and the IoT. Also in [?] the authors present their solutions in order to
achieve privacy preservation during the communications between all the components
of an IoT system. In [?] the authors’ present public-key cryptosystems as desirable
solutions whenever there is a need for data integrity and authenticity.
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1.8 Structure of the thesis
We shown how IoHT solutions changed the healthcare system and the clinical
trials, giving birth to the digital clinical trials. The need for privacy is intrinsic
in personal health data and we are interested in guaranteeing as much privacy as
possible, especially during all the phases that compose a digital clinical trial. We
now introduce the arguments covered in this dissertation, in Figure ?? we grouped
them for ease of explaination.
Figure 1.6. Dissertation arguments
In this introductory chapter we introduced the clinical trials and their phases
and we gave some insight regarding digital clinical trials. Then we analyzed the
need for privacy that is intrisic in any healthcare related application and the
how the enforcement of GDPR regulation changed the way to handle sensitive
data. The common centralized approach used nowadays in personal data-focused
application were illustrated, among with some possible techniques to enhance privacy.
Challenges posed by the usage of data generated by IoHT devices were introduced.
All these concepts are highlighted within the green box in Figure ??. The rest of
the dissertation is organized as follows.
In Chapter ?? we present the core of our work, diving into an alternative approach
of conducting digital clinical trials. We suppose to work in an untrusted environment
where the only chance to effectively protect the personal data is containing it within
the private space of the users as much as possible and only very limited (and
anonymized and privatized) information is exchanged outside. The interested third
parties, namely the clinical research institutions, are interested in accessing the
personal data of the users. They want to accomplish two mainly tasks: characterize
the population of users and recruit suitable patients for a specific digital clinical trial.
The recruiting of patients relies on a blockchain technology (the smart contracts)
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and on the recruiting function. The characterization phase can be used instead even
before starting a digital clinical trial. We show two different approaches: one based
on a distributed privacy preserving clustering algorithm and another that relies
upon the properties of random projections. The latter approach guarantees user
privacy on one hand while allowing the execution of interesting machine learning
algorithms for clustering patients on the other. We demonstrate that this approach
offer strong privacy also in case of data breaches. In Figure ?? we highlight the
covered arguments within an orange box.
In Chapter ?? we show the embedded device that we designed and realized to
validate our architecture. In the specific we dig into the hardware and software
solutions that were necessary to obtain a device capable of long lasting operation
with little to none maintenance. The data produced by this device is secure and it
is possible to track its authenticity. In Figure ??, this chapter is highlighted within
the yellow box.
Finally, in Chapter ?? (not shown in Figure ??) we briefly recap the work done
and its limitations. Hints for future works are presented at the end.
31
Chapter 2
Data management in private
space
In this chapter, we illustrate the advancements in enhancing the privacy of theusers during the first phases of digital clinical trials and our concept of privatespace where the private data is located [?, ?, ?]. We took into account the
privacy risks posed by the use of IoT devices aimed to healthcare, and we introduce
some solutions able to contain them. At the end of the chapter, we present a practical
attack that could endanger our solution and we show how this solution can contain
the damage subsequent to the data breach [?, ?].
It is evident that when data management is done with a trusted authority, the
user has to completely trust the Clininal Research Institute for the protection of its
sensitive data. Unfortunately, the uncontrolled growth of internet-centred services
has led us to accept many compromises about how data are shared. Interestingly, for
certain phases of a clinical trial (namely users characterization and patients recruiting)
it is possible to avoid the transfer of most of the private data from the private space
to the trusted space while allowing the Clinical Research Institute to conduct
these steps without accessing clear confidential data. In fact, during the recruiting
phase the users can choose to participate without disclosing any information, while
during the characterizing phase, all the data shared are anonymized or shared in
privacy-preserving fashion. The central idea is to take advantage of the increased
computational capabilities of the IoT devices to reinforce the privacy of confidential
data while still conforming to all requirements relevant to data protection, including
the GDPR. Therefore the user may retain complete control of the private data and
be free to decide if the data will be accessible by the researchers or not. Moreover,
in [?], the authors propose a distributed solution that targets diabetes clinical trails.
Similarly to our solution, they leverage the blockchain technology to safely store
information and uses multi party computation in order to process data. Their
approach however is not GDPR compliant since it does not give individuals the
ability to revoke the access to their personal data.
In particular during the initial design, recruting and enrollment phases of a
clinical trial (see Figure ??) an alternative approach is feasible, in which the personal
user data is not stored in any trusted space, instead, this data always remain in the
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Figure 2.1. A simplified representation of the first phases af a digital clinical trial where
the privacy of the users is retained. Once the user accept to enroll, data ar threated as
in the common approach depicted in figure ??
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private spaces of the users. In the subsequent enrollment phase, when the users are
enrolled on a clinical trial, the data needed by the Clinical Research Institute to
conduct the actual research are transferred to the trusted space with all the necessary
anonymization or pseudonymization steps described in the previous section. Such
an alternative approach allows users to retain the maximum control over their data
until the point when they are sure that the Clinical Research Institute can generate
value from the use of their data. At this point the users will receive their fair part
of the value created. Therefore, this approach of moving data management from the
trusted space to the private space follows the arguments of the My Data is Mine
declaration1.
In more details, during the recruiting phase, the clinical research institutes has
two main needs, namely a) to characterize the community of potential users so that it
can design an effective clinical trial and b) to recruit suitable users. Both these tasks
can be done without having access to the data collected by the users and thus without
any potential violation of the privacy of the users. A simplified representation of
the proposed approach is shown in Figure ??. Initially, the user participates in
the characterization process that allows the clinical research institution to better
design the clinical trial. Then the clinical research institute starts the recruiting
process contacting all the users. Only those users that match the specific criteria
are invited to enrol in the trial. The matching is computed in the private space of
the users thus no personal information is disclosed. As a consequence only users
actually enrolled in the clinical trial will deliver their personal data to the trusted
space, while all the others will not reveal any relevant information except the one
necessary to characterize the population, process that however has been designed to
preserve the privacy of the user.
The critical assumption in this alternative approach is that IoT devices and
commonly available data processing equipment residing within the private space
of the user will be capable of guaranteeing the security and confidentiality of the
sensitive data. These processing elements interact with the Data Controller and
Data Processor residing within the trusted space. It is evident that the resulting
distributed system is composed of a variety of different subsystems that operate
with a plethora of privacy and trust requirements. The design of such a system-
of-systems is particularly complex due to the interactions of IoT systems with
real-world processes [?]. Inevitably, delivering robust applications requires testing
and performance evaluation of individual system components as well as compositions
of the system on real hardware in large-scale deployments. Given the increased
production of IoT hardware nodes and the introduction of new tools for managing
IoT testbeds (e.g., see [?, ?]) it is important to incorporate in the design process a
real-world testbed deployment, such as the IoT-Lab facility2.
In the following sections, we present the design and the realization of three
phases of a digital clinical trial (namely the recruiting, the enrollment and the users
characterization) that follow the distributed data management approach introduced
before. The design is accompanied by a proof-of-concept (PoC) implementation that
allows to evaluate the proposed solutions in real-world hardware and to get a first
1http://www.mydataismine.com/manifest
2IoT-LAB: a very large scale open testbed, https://www.iot-lab.info/
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feedback on the feasibility of this alternative approach.
The PoC uses embedded devices with different processor architectures (such as
Microchip ATMega128RFA1, ST Microelectronics STM32L476 and STM32F103)
and different wireless technologies (both standard - like 802.15.4 - and non standard
protocols communicating over the ISM band, at 868 MHz or 2.4 GHz) to emulate
the wearable devices for the generation of biometric data.
A Raspberry Pi3 Model B+ produced by Raspberry Pi is used to represent a
commonly available data processing unit residing in the private space that on one
hand interacts with the IoHT devices of the user, and on the other hand it interacts
with the parties outside the private space, such as the blockchain and the Clinical
Research Institute. It has a powerful ARM Cortex-A53 microprocessor with 1GB of
LPDDR2 RAM on-board (see Figure ??). The gateway supports the same wireless
technologies used by the wearables devices and, thus, can communicate with them.
This device is also referred to as the “gateway” device since it enables the interaction
between the private and trusted spaces.
Finally, a standard PC (Intel i7-6500U, RAM 8GB DDR3) is used to represent
the Clinical Research Institute and implement the necessary functionality residing
in the trusted space.
Figure 2.2. The Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ produced by Raspberry Pi. Copyright CC
BY-SA. Credits www.raspberrypi.org
The blockchain is a distributed database that permanently stores data. It is often
referred as a distributed ledger. This database is accessible from everywhere there
is an connection to the pool of participants, commonly through a simple internet
connection. Every entity can write into the database but it is costly, instead reading
data from it is free. This so-called cost depends on the blockchain used. It can be,
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for example, processing power, virtual or real money and other. Every change made
in the database is recorded, so that also a small modification leaves a permanent
trace. Some implementations of the blockchain, like Ethereum that we used, allow
to embed small portions of code inside the chain, allowing for example to release an
amount of virtual coins after an event happened. This portions of code are called
smart contracts. We rely heavily on smart contracts. For example, we use them to
store the hash of the private data and the public keys of the smart devices used, but
also to identify nodes capabilities and specifications (like accuracy, reliability, etc.).
2.1 Architecture
We now introduce the general architecture in Figure ?? with a specific emphasis
on private and untrusted spaces. This architecture allows to conduct recruitment
in digital clinical trials using a decentralized approach. We consider individual
users that are using a collection of (a) wearable devices attached on them and (b)
smart devices positioned within their home environment. These devices compose
the IoHT of each user in Figure ??. The gateway is in charge to communicate with
the IoHT and to manage the storage in the private space and it also handles all
the communications happening between the private and the untrusted space. The
blockchain, the internet and also the clinical research institutes are considered part
of the untrusted space since the single user has little to none control over them.
Figure 2.3. The macro blocks composing our general architecture, with a specific emphasis
on private and untrusted spaces
Move one step ahead, we now show in detail (Figure ??) all the steps required
to recruit and enroll a patient in a digital clinical trial. Into the private space of
the user (namely, the home environment) there are IoT devices dedicated to gather
data. They collect information about the health status of the individual, his habits
and more. Currently, all wearable devices (and smart devices) are equipped with an
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identifier that encodes the manufacturer, model number and production series. The
proposed approach requires that they are also equipped with a tamper proof memory
space where the manufacturer places a private key. The corresponding public key is
stored on the blockchain and thus publicly accessible by any entity. This allows a
research institute to identify the devices available to the individual and to decide if
the data collected are within the accuracy requirements.
Within the home environment there is also a so-called gateway to which peri-
odically all available IoT devices communicates with. These communications are
private and digitally signed using an asymmetric key scheme. The data received
by the gateway (step 1 in Figure ??) is stored locally into a local storage (the so-
called private database in Figure ??). Furthermore, whenever the wearable devices
communicate the collected data to the gateway, all packets are digitally signed and
therefore the gateway can check their integrity and authenticity, and discard those
that are arriving from untrusted devices. Periodically, the gateway applies a hash
function over the collected (trusted) data with its signature (stored into the private
database) and the result of this hash function is safely stored into the blockchain
(step 2 in Figure ??) (thus, into the untrusted space).
Saving the hashing into a blockchain solution will allow later the Clinical Research
Institute to check that the dataset provided are indeed the ones collected over the
period of time claimed. Moreover, the clinical research institute can check the
authenticity of the retrieved data since the hash take into account the signature of
the devices generating data and the corresponding public keys of these devices are
stored into the blockchain too.
Figure 2.4. Recruit and enroll a patient in a digital clinical trial
Up to now, no data is brought externally from the private space except for the
hash. A clinical research institute interested in recruit for a digital clinical trial
should now design a recruiting test. The recruiting test is a function that analyses a
historic dataset provided by the individual users and decides if the candidate should
be included or excluded. The analysis is encoded into code that generates only
constant-size output (i.e., O(1)) and thus cannot include any personal data that
can violate the confidentiality of the candidates. The Clinical Research Institute
sends the code to all interested parties (step 3 in Figure ??). Each gateway locally
execute it on the locally stored historic data. If the user agrees to participate in the
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trial, and the result of this function states that this user is fit for the trial, only then
the output of the recruiting test is transmitted to the Clinical Research Institute
without revealing any of the private data (step 4 in Figure ??). If the candidate is
eventually enrolled for the actual trial, he provides his actual historic data (step 5
in Figure ??) and the Clinical Research Institute can finally check the data integrity
employing the hash function published in the chain (step 6 in Figure ??).
As already observed, in the enrollment phase (that started in step 5 in Figure ??),
participants have to trust the data management of the research institute. In view
of this, instead of the blockchain, a more traditional trusted and certified database
could be used to store all relevant information. However, we decided to employ the
blockchain in our solution, because its P2P (and trustless) nature is in line with the
principles of participation, personal data ownership and accountability that inspired
our design.
2.2 Guaranteeing originality and authenticity of collected
data
Initially, the Clinical Research Institute conducts certain accuracy evaluation tests
over various off-the-shelf wearable devices and smart devices to compile a list of
“trusted” devices that it considers accurate enough so that data collected from these
devices can be used through the digital screening phase. Based on an adequate set
of genuine historic values collected from one or more of these “trusted” devices, the
clinical research institute analyses the data (e.g., using a combination of logistic
regression models, principal component analysis, etc.) and decides if the patient will
be included or excluded. This is translated into the following requirements.
• The quality of data provided by participants is guaranteed (only consider data
collected from approved devices).
• Data are collected by certified and trusted devices.
• Fake data cannot be introduced into the private space.
One way to address the above requirements is for the wearable devices to digitally
sign all the packets containing genuine measurements before transmitting them to the
gateway. The digital signing is done using an identifier that encodes the manufacturer,
model number and production series along with a private key that is installed in a
tamper-proof memory space. The corresponding public key is stored on a blockchain
residing in the untrusted space to make it publicly accessible by both the gateways
and the Clinical Research Institutes. Therefore the Clinical Research Institute is
capable of identifying the devices available to each individual user and deciding if
the data collected are within the accuracy requirements. Moreover, the gateway
can check their integrity and authenticity, and discard those that are arriving from
untrusted devices.
A proof-of-concept implementation is done using the open-source uECC library3
available on RiotOS4. This implementation supports the recommended elliptic curve
3https://github.com/kmackay/micro-ecc
4https://riot-os.org/
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[?] over binary fields with equation y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1 along with the irreducible
polynomial f(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1. The curve’s order (the number of points
on it, r) and the base point is G(x, y) are listed on Table ??. The testing blockchain
residing in the trusted space is implemented based on the Ethereum Blockchain App
Platform5.
Parameter Value
r 0x4000000000000000000020108a2e0cc0d99f8a5ef
x 0x2fe13c0537bbc11acaa07d793de4e6d5e5c94eee8
y 0x289070fb05d38ff58321f2e800536d538ccdaa3d9
Table 2.1. Parameters for the Basic Elliptic Curve Operations.
The evaluation indicates that the signature function is by far the most time-
consuming, while the hashing is always relatively fast. Figure ?? shows the time
necessary to sign 64000 bytes of data on the resource constrained M3 Open nodes
dividing them in chunks of different size (1000× 64 bytes, 100× 640 bytes, 10× 6400
bytes, 1× 64000 bytes).
Figure 2.5. Time necessary to sign chunks of data of different sizes for an overall of 64000
bytes. Please note the logarithmic scale.
The total time necessary to sign 1000 chunks of 64 bytes were more than 200sec,
namely more than 400 times bigger than the time necessary to sign the chunk of 64
Kbytes (about half a second). Furthermore, when we consider chunks of 64 bytes,
the signature occupies about one-third of the payload, while in the 64000 bytes case
it is less than 0.1%. This result suggests that some form of aggregation is always
necessary to implement a practical solution.
The M3 Open Node (see Figure ??) is the first device that we used in our PoC.
It is provided by IoT-Lab and its microcontroller is an ARM Cortex M3 with 32 bit
architecture running at 72 Mhz. It has 64kB of RAM.
Despite we have no performance measurement on our node (based on an ARM
Cortex M4 with 32 bit architecture running at 80 Mhz. It has 128kB of RAM), its
performances are comparable with the ones shown in Figure ??.
5https://www.ethereum.org/
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Figure 2.6. M3 Open Node from IoT-Lab. Copyright © FIT IoT-LAB
2.2.1 Interacting with the blockchain
Data acquired in the private space are periodically hashed and stored in the
blockchain. This allows the Clinical Research Institute to validate the authen-
ticity, integrity and conformance of collected data. Since the interaction with the
choosed Ethereum blockchain technology is expensive in terms of computing power,
it was convenient to delegate it to the gateway.
The blockchain is also used to store the public key associated with the healthcare
devices and published by the manufacturers of the IoHT devices on the blockchain.
In this way the clinical research institutions can check which device generated each
piece of data. Moreover, since it is possible to understand the class of devices
generating data, it is possible to discriminate only the devices that are accurate
enough for the specific application. Providing guarantees on the performance of
validating transactions in the blockchain is not possible by definition, but usually is
in the order of minutes (using Ethereum blockchain technology). On the contrary,
the time necessary to read the blockchain is negligible (O(1)) because the entire
blockchain is stored locally.
The very structure of the blockchain provides a mean of timestamping. So that,
clinical research institution (or any interested third parties) can retrieve the hash of
the stored data and considering the associated timestamp can check if the data was
actually retrieved in the considered timestamp. Thus, malicious gateways cannot
inject data after the recruiting phase stating it was generated before, since the
blockchain does not allow it.
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2.3 Privacy preserving digital screening process
The Clinical Research Institute starts the recruitment phase based on the patient
profiles specified in the previous steps. The screening relies on an adequate set of
genuine historic values collected from one or more of these “trusted” devices, the
clinical research institute analyses the data (e.g., using a combination of logistic
regression models, principal component analysis, etc.) and decides if the patient will
be included or excluded. We translate these steps into the following requirements.
• The inclusion/exclusion of a candidate is based on the result returned by a
well-defined recruiting test automatically executed over a provided data set of
historic values.
• The candidate must provide proof that the historical data set is real and
collected over the stated period of time.
• An individual that wishes to be considered for a specific clinical trial expects
that the privacy of his/her personal data will be respected and the confidential-
ity of the private data will be guaranteed. If during the digital screening phase
the individual is excluded, then the digital health system should guarantee
that no personal data will be retained by the Clinical Research Institute.
It is assumed that a recruiting test is used by the Clinical Research Institute
to discriminate whether a candidate is suitable to enrol for a given clinical trial.
Different recruiting tests are assumed based on machine learning algorithms within
the following two main scenarios.
S1 The data in the private space, possibly pre-processed to extract relevant
features, are used to learn some model. The parameters of such a model are
given as inputs to the recruiting test.
S2 A given pre-computed model is embedded by the Clinical Research Institute
into the recruiting test, and some features of the data in the private space are
given in input to such model in order to classify the candidate.
In S1, both features extraction and machine learning are performed by the
gateway, while in S2, the model for the machine learning phase is computed by the
Clinical Research Institute and provided to the gateway to execute the classification
based on the features extracted.
2.3.1 The recruiting test
The recruiting test is a function provided by the clinical research institute. Its role
is to analyze the historic dataset of the individual and to decide if the candidate
should be included or excluded. It is, again, important to highlight that at this point
the personal data of an individual is still in his/her full control. The evalutation of
this function is processed completely within the private space of an individual, so
that none of his/her personal data is disclosed (see Figure ??).
The analysis is encoded into code that generates only constant-size output (i.e.,
O(1)) and thus cannot include any personal data that can violate the confidentiality
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Figure 2.7. Recruiting function
of the candidates. It is mandatory to highlight that trivial recruiting functions must
not be allowed. In fact, a sequence of trivial recruiting functions can execute a binary
search. This is a known limitation at the moment, so that we consider that there
is a mechanism that rejects such functions. The Clinical Research Institute sends
the code to all interested parties (step 3 in Figure ??). Again, the gateways locally
execute it on the locally stored historic data. The user can choose (see Figure ??) to
send the result of this recruiting function to the Clinical Research Institute without
revealing any of the private data (step 4 in Figure ??). The user is also free to refuse
to reply to the recruiting function, exiting the recruiting process immediately. If
the participant is eventually enrolled for the actual trial, he/she provides her actual
historic data (step 5 in Figure ??) and the Clinical Research Institute can finally
check the data integrity employing the hash function published in the chain (step 6
in Figure ??).
Figure 2.8. Recruiting function with user interaction
At a preliminary investigation with physicians, in many practical cases, the
recruiting test is relatively simple and mostly based on threshold functions. However,
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in our experiments, we performed some tests to evaluate the ability of our PoC
to allow more complex and general recruiting tests based on machine learning
algorithms.
2.3.2 Performances
In order to evaluate the performance of the two scenarios introduced in Section ??,
we choose four real-world datasets that are provided by the UCI Machine Learning
Repository [?]. They vary both in the number of samples and in the number of
features, accordingly to table ??. Two of them target health issues such as cancer
and heart diseases (Arcene and Heart Diseases - Cleveland). EEG Eye State, instead,
correlates the EEG with open or closed eyes while Gisette has been selected to stress
the performance analysis.
Table 2.2. Datasets used to evalute performances
# Dataset Name Number of Samples Number of Features
1 Arcene 100 10000
2 EEG Eye State 13444 14
3 Heart Disease 270 13
4 Gisette 6000 5000
Machine Learning. The main goal of this experiment is to evaluate the ability
of our architecture (in the specific, the ability of our gateway) to support the
computation of complex recruiting functions on realistic data-sets. Six well-known
machine-learning algorithms are used, available in the Python package scikit-learn [?].
Their execution times are shown in table ??.
Remark that the objective of the evaluation conducted here is to measure the
performance in terms of execution time. Since both processing units are executing
the same algorithms and with exactly the same implementations, the accuracy is
the same. The fine-tuning of such algorithms, in order to improve the effectiveness
of the results, is not within the scope of this work.
In all cases the gateway is an order of magnitude slower than the PC but it can
execute the algorithms in a reasonable time. The algorithms that are more demand-
ing in terms of memory requirements can easily exhaust the memory generating
significant delays (e.g., due to memory swaps) and in some cases create Memory
Errors on the resource-constrained gateway.
Features Extraction. Raw data generated by the IoT devices in the private
space are elaborated in order to extract relevant features provided as input to
the machine learning algorithms. In this experiment, the ECG data are analyzed
following the methodology of [?]. First, a Butterworth Band Pass Filter of the
5th order is applied. Then the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) is calculated on the
signal and the associated Power Spectral Density (PSD) are computed. Finally, the
mean, the standard deviation, the variance and the maximum peak of the signal are
obtained for statistical purposes.
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Table 2.3. Execution times of common machine learning algorithms. Each row corresponds
to the equivalent dataset in table ??
# PC Gateway
Support Vector Machines
1 0.147322s 0.695988s
2 45.561s 565.288s
3 0.005111s 0.061623s
4 250.205s 1180.824s
Logistic Regression
1 0.133114s 1.639809s
2 0.177369s 2.124157s
3 0.001498s 0.020984s
4 1.707945s 22.940s
k Nearest Neighbors
1 0.010120s 0.086751s
2 0.009555s 0.125092s
3 0.000355s 0.002438s
4 1.315992s 18.851s
Gaussian Mixture Models
1 0.245765s 2.103226s
2 0.667314s 7.934804s
3 0.011209s 0.087351s
4 30.658s Memory Error
k-Means
1 0.116964s 0.859489s
2 0.029887s 0.293893s
3 0.003146s 0.035679s
4 8.616173s Memory Error
PCA
1 0.463008s 3.250940s
2 0.055881s 0.662027s
3 0.000539s 0.003660s
4 40.488s Memory Error
Table 2.4. Execution times to elaborate ECG
PC Gateway
Filtering 0.114648s 1.483026s
FFT and PSD 0.621372s 4.410873s
Statistics 0.016048s 0.115040s
Total 0.752068s 6.008939s
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Table ?? reports the execution times required to analyze one hour of real ECG
data sampled at 360Hz [?]. Again, the findings indicate that the gateway is roughly
an order of magnitude slower than the PC, but it can extract important and complex
features in absolutely reasonable times, with just a bit more 6 seconds of time
required.
2.4 Distributed privacy-preserving characterization
Relying upon regulation to obtain guarantees on privacy and safety requires trustness,
both with respect to the enforcement of the regulamentation by the government
and on its effective application by the companies. In some digital clinical trial
applications, however, it is important to infer something about an individual instead
of accessing its whole personal data. Technically speaking, it is possible, under
some circumstances, to infer something about an individual not from exactly its
personal data but from a “privatized“ version of it. The mathematical method of
random projection could be exploited in order to mask the clear data of an individual.
Moreover, this approach also provides some guarantees of resilience against a data
breach.
In this section we show a distributed approach to characterize a group of users in
a privacy-preserving fashion, while the next Section ?? is dedicated to our work on
random projections applied to personal health data. We concentrate on the results
given by common machine learning algorithms both on the clear health data and on
the random projected health data. It will be clear that, thanks to random projection
methods, it is possible to share “privatized” health data without disclosing personal
information while making the same data useful for different kind of algorithms. In
the end of this chapter, we will focus instead upon the possible de-privatization
of projected data following a data breach. Under real-world usage scenarios, the
chances to deprivatize data will be very low.
The Clinical Research Institute is interested in grouping candidates according to
their characteristics in order to a) understand the community of potential patients, b)
better design the clinical trial. For this purpose, a privacy preserving data clustering
is conducted by carefully specifying the desired features relevant for the purpose of
the trial. The features include the evaluation of specific biometric attributes (e.g.,
body composition, heart operation, daily activity, etc.) collected by the patient
using wearable technologies over a given period of time (e.g., blood pressure for past
week, etc.). During this process, the user’s privacy is preserved since none of the
private data is disclosed. The only information received back from the institution
are the ones necessary to identify the clusters without disclosing data on the single
users.
For the sake of simplicity, horizontally distributed data are considered in which
the personal data of each party are disjoint and the parties want to jointly cluster
their records without revealing their personal data. In the experiments reported
here, the library presented in [?] is used to implement the proposed algorithm of
Samet and Miri [?]. The performance of the privacy-preserving clustering algorithm
is evaluated in comparison to that achieved by a standard PC available in the trusted
2.5 Random projections and privacy 45
Figure 2.9. Execution time (in seconds) of the privacy preserving clustering algorithm on
PC (orange) and gateway (blue)
space and the low-capabilities PC commonly available within the private space. The
results of the performance evaluation are shown in Figure ??.
Four parameters are examined independently: the total number of points used, the
number of candidates (entities) participating in the privacy-preserving computation,
the point cardinality, and the number of clusters (clusteroids) used as input (k) to
the algorithm. The effect of each of these parameters is evaluated independently, by
keeping fixed the others. However, it is clear that all these parameters affect the
overall performance of the algorithm.
For the purposes of these analyses, synthetic datasets were used with specified
bounds and distributions that are within biometric data reflecting heart rate, body
mass, steps, etc.. Each parameter-set was run and evaluated over 10 iterations–
in realistic situations, the number of iterations may vary with convergence time
depending on the data and random initialization of the centroids. Depending on the
parameters examined, the clustering algorithm may require a different number of
rounds to reach convergence. In order to provide comparable results, the execution
time is being reported as the mean time required to conduct 1 round of the algorithm.
2.5 Random projections and privacy
With the availability of accessible and widely used cloud services, it is natural
that large components of healthcare systems migrate to them; for example, patient
databases can be stored and processed in the cloud. Such cloud services provide
enhanced flexibility and additional gains, such as availability, ease of data share,
and so on. This trend poses serious threats regarding the privacy of the patients
and the trust that an individual must put into the healthcare system itself. Thus,
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there is a strong need of privacy preservation, achieved through a variety of different
approaches. We study the application of a random projection-based approach to
patient data as a means to achieve two goals: (1) provably mask the identity of
users under some adversarial-attack settings, (2) preserve enough information to
allow for aggregate data analysis and application of machine-learning techniques.
As far as we know, such approaches have not been applied and tested on medical
data. We analyze the trade-off between the loss of accuracy on the outcome of
machine-learning algorithms and the resilience against an adversary. We show that
random projections proved to be strong against known input/output attacks while
offering high quality data, as long as the projected space is smaller than the original
space, and as long as the amount of leaked data available to the adversary is limited.
Given the sensitive nature of healthcare data, there is a strong need to protect
the information of the patients. Furthermore, the recent adoption of General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and now it must be
applied to any organisation or individual that collects and processes information
related to EU citizens, regardless where the data is physically stored or where they
are based[?, ?]. At the same time, analysis of such data are crucial for medical
research and the drug industry. Consequently, there is a need to design approaches
that allow data processing without exposing the personal underlying information.
For this reason, there has been a series of techniques for perturbing data such that
information on individual data points cannot be leaked, while aggregate information
is preserved. Examples of such approaches are k-anonymity [?] and differential
privacy [?]. The various approaches put different importance on the privacy require-
ments; for instance, differential privacy attempts to alter the data such as to provide
very strong privacy guarantees, typically, without specifying the usefulness of the
resulting data. for general-purpose data analysis.
In this chapter we apply a method, which can be found in [?], where the explicit
goal is to obtain a dataset that remains useful after the perturbation (still providing
some privacy guarantees). More specifically, our approach is based on random
projections (RP), a technique that is typically applied primarily for efficiency reasons.
It is based on a fundamental result from the work of Johnson and Lindenstrauss [?]
and the idea is the following: Assume that we have large amounts of data (n
datapoints), lying on a high-dimensional space. Then, if we project each point to
a random subspace of dimension O(logn/2), with high probability all pairwise
distances between the data points are preserved within a factor of 1 ± . This
technique has found multiple applications in streaming algorihtms, in finding nearest
neighbors in high-dimensional spaces, in reducing the dimension of databases, and
so on.
Our idea of applying a random projection approach on privacy-preserving data
mining is the following. Assume that we have the records of multiple patients. Then
we can consider a random projection of these data. The result of Johnson and
Lindenstrauss guarantees that if we execute algorithms that depend on the pairwise
distances on the data (e.g., several clustering or classification algorithms), then the
results obtained are with high probability similar to those obtained on the real data
set (and the error can be quantified). Furthermore, because the projections are
random, one cannot use the projected data to obtain the real data: each datapoint
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appears to be random. This last statement holds also in the case where a third
party is interested in estimated data and even if he knows the projection matrix.
In fact, estimating real data starting from the random projected one remains hard
even if the attacker has some significant computing power. This trade off is studied
in previous works (e.g. [?, ?]).
It is not clear a priori that this approach could work in the application on medical
dataset that interests us. For instance, the lemma by Johnson and Lindenstrauss is
typically applied on settings where the original data lie on a very high-dimensional
space. However, in practice, the original dimension may be low (for instance in
our dataset it is about 50). In this chapter, we look at this and other issues by
applying the random projection to a dataset containing information about 70K cases
of diabetes [?]. We show that it is possible to reduce the dimensionality of the data
and still obtain accuracy scores that are comparable with the ones obtained from
the original non-projected data. At the same time, we also show how sensible and
private patient information such their age or gender are safe against attacks that try
to reconstruct the mapping between the original data and the projected data after
applying random projections.
2.5.1 State of the art
Data leakages are very common [?]. In this work, we are more interested in reducing
the ability of an attacker to reconstruct non-yet-leaked data from the leaked one.
Within medical premises, there are multiple individuals who could obtain access to
protected information from the rightous doctor to untrustful workers. This could
lead to multiple entities knowing protected personal health information.
Before 2003, with the enforcing of HIPAA rules, some private medical information
were regularly shared among professional [?]. Following the guidelines from Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [?], the US government made
the first concrete attempt to mitigate the chance of re-identification of patients.
In 2009, it was clear that HIPAA is not sufficient to protect the privacy of an
individual. In fact, the HIPAA was not able to protect the user personal information
after the anonimization process that substituted HIPAA parameters with IDs. In
a famous case [?], some researchers were able to re-identify users and also their
sexual orientation and other information. Moreover, the availability of correlated
data (coming from the same source or other sources) could greatly help to identify a
patient. Data breaches continue to increase year after year, between 2005 and 2014,
only in the US, more than 26 million of people had some form of personal health
information leaked [?].
Therefore, more elaborate tecniques, which add noise to the data, have been
developed in the last years to protect users’ privacy and still maintain a good level of
accuracy when exploring and analyzing the data. One of these is differential privacy
[?]. This approach focuses on providing statistically coherent responses querying a
database, i.e. third parties are interested to query for information about a sample of
a population, not a single individual. Instead, we are interested also in providing
data about a specific individual, for example investigating if he or she is suitable for
a clinical trial.
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In [?] the authors proved that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform can be
used as an alternative approach to achieve differential privacy. The method is
then compared against other techniques, such as adding Gaussian noise to data or
randomized response. The proposed approach has superior accuracy bounds than the
others, while still keeping secure the privacy of the records. The authors also criticize
the work of Liu et al. about releasing data to third parties after applying random
projections in order to protect sensitive information while still preserving accuracy of
different data mining algorithms: an adversary that has some background knowledge
can infer approximations of the original data. We address this issue in the scenario of
known input-output data (section ??) and show how in real world scenario regarding
medical data, under reasonable assumptions for the power of the adversary, it is
difficult for an attacker to discover private information from projected records.
In the literature there exist a very large number of works regarding the re-
identification of person starting from various data, within some degree it is called
“breaking the k-anonimity”. For example in [?] the authors presents a method to
re-identify a user from its preferences.
In this chapter, we aim at investigating to what extent RPs can provide useful
data for machine learning algorithms (e.g. classification) on a group of potential
patients while preserving at the same time the privacy of individuals. RPs have been
employed in a number of healthcare applications, for example to segment tumor
areas [?], to enhance tomography [?], to cluster DNA microarrays[?] or to classify
cancer [?].
In [?], RPs were used to mask clear data projecting them in smaller spaces,
while in [?] and [?], similarly to our work, the authors discuss how to exploit RPs
to enhance data privacy. The authors in [?] also discuss the utility of the RP in
reducing complexity of problems while maintaining the usefulness of the projected
data for algorithms. It is anticipated that by 2020 there will be more than 26 billion
devices involved in IoT related applications [?]. Surely, not all of them will be part of
the healthcare field, however we expect a very large amount of information to process.
The usefulness of RP in reducing problem complexity (or resource requirements)
is well understood and exploited as useful resource in the literature [?, ?, ?, ?, ?].
For example, in [?], the authors explore some ways to reduce high dimensional data
for clustering while, in [?], is presented a work on classification of small patches of
images from a very large database that takes advantage of the properties offered by
RPs.
During the last two decades, the contribution of machine learning and data
mining algorithms in healthcare applications became more frequent year after year.
This is well demonstrated in the literature, for example in [?, ?, ?, ?]. One last
aspect to consider is the chance to link together multiple datasets. For example
in [?], the authors presented the infrastructure of a databank in order to enable
record-linkage research studies. This linkage on one hand could deeply help the
development of newer treatments or drugs, but on the other hand poses threats to
the privacy of the individuals.
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2.5.2 Problem formulation
We consider a reference scenario in which a group of users, characterized by private
features, are potentially suitable for a clinical trial. Only a limited number of users
in the group will be actually enrolled in the trial. For the enrolled users, namely the
patients, the private features will be eventually made public to participate to the
clinical trial in the most effective way. Some knowledge on the group is of primary
importance for the researchers to understand the size and the characteristics of
potential patients. In general, users are well disposed to support this need of the
researchers provided that their privacy is preserved. The main problem we want to
address in this chapter is:
Can we learn something on the group of users as a whole, while preserving the
privacy of the individuals who will not participate in the trial?
More formally, we consider a group of n users, where each user u is characterized
by m features. We represent the corresponding dataset as a matrix X ∈ Rm×n, with
m rows (the features) and n columns (the users). As already observed, in the era of
big data, m and n can be particularly big.
Giannella et al. [?] show how it is possible to break the privacy in some contexts
of distance preserving mappings. Liu [?] instead, highlights how mappings that
do preserve distances within certain bounds like random projections can boost the
privacy guarantees. We will apply these techniques in order to prove that users’
privacy can be kept safe against malicious attackers.
We are interested in understanding to what extent the random projection tech-
nique, which has been originally conceived to reduce the dimensionality of a dataset,
can also be used to preserve the privacy of the users. In particular, we apply a random
projection to X, such that if R ∈ Rk×m is the random-projection matrix Y = RX is
the transformed matrix after applying the random projection, with Y ∈ Rk×n. We
denote by xui the column in X associated to user ui, and with yui the corresponding
column in Y . In the scenario we are describing the projected matrix Y is known to
the public, it is indeed the dataset on which researchers try to distill information on
the group; the transformation matrix R and the original data X are private. Some
columns of X may become public once the corresponding users will eventually decide
to participate to a clinical trial, in other words some pairs (xui , yui ) will become public.
We can now better describe the problem, splitting it into two sub-problems:
Accuracy. Can we learn something on the group exploiting Y ? Here we want to
understand if the results of some machine-learning algorithms on Y are a good
approximation of the ones obtained on X. If we answer positively to this
question, we can at least conclude that what can be learned from the original
data can be also learned from the projected data.
Privacy. Can we preserve the privacy of the individuals that will not participate
in the trial? As already observed, Y is public whereas only some columns of
X will eventually become public when the corresponding users will decide to
participate in a clinical trial. Consequently, some pairs (xui , yui ) will become
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public. Here we want to understand if an attacker knowing Y and the some
pairs (xui , yui ) can possibly know something about the other users that do not
participate in the trial.
We now elaborate on these two dimensions.
2.5.3 Accuracy
Lemma ?? provides a technique to generate a low-dimensional representation of
the original data maintaining the pairwise distance within an error . Since the
pairwise distance is the key ingredient for many classification tasks performed by
machine learning algorithms, this property allow us to have some guarantees that
the solution found in the low-dimensional space is a good approximation of the
solution in the original and higher dimensional space. Furthermore, reducing the
size of the input data speeds-up the execution time of the algorithms and limits
the amount of resources needed. It can be proved that a random projection, is a
mapping f that fulfills the previous lemma with positive probability. This is often
referred as JL-embeddings.
Johnson and Lindenstrauss lemma
(Johnson and Lindenstrauss) Given  > 0 and an integer n let k be a positive integer
such that k ≥ k0 = O( log(n)2 ). For every set P of n points in Rm there exists a
mapping f : Rm → Rk such that for all u, v ∈ P
(1− ) ‖ u− v ‖2≤‖ f(u)− f(v) ‖2≤ (1 + ) ‖ u− v ‖2
2.5.4 Privacy: Known Input–Output Attack
We now try to answer one of the questions we raised in the previous section: Can a
malicious third party who knows some pairs (xui , yui ) (i.e. that a particular record
xui is associated to yui after its projection) learn information about other records?
Liu in his Ph.D. thesis [?] describes a Bayes privacy model to measure the privacy
offered by a perturbation technique. The model considers the attacker’s apriori
and a posteriori beliefs about the data and uses Bayesian inference to evaluate the
privacy. For completeness, we repeat his framework here.
Let x be the unknown private data, y the perturbed data and θ the attacker’s
additional knowledge about the data. Then the MAP estimate of x given y and θ is
xˆMAP (y, θ) = arg max
x
fx|y,θ(x|y, θ)
with fx|y,θ the conditional probability density of x given y and θ.
Let Xp denote the first p columns of X and Xn−p the remaining columns. We
define similarly Yp and Yn−p. We further assume that the columns of Xp are
linearly independent and that Xp is known to the attacker (i.e., the attacker has full
knowledge of p patients). Y is entirely known to the attacker, because as we stated
before, it is publicly available to conduct experiments on the projected data.
For the next reasoning the following hypothesis must be verified:
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• The original data arose from as a sample from a matrix variate distribution.
• The projection matrix R is a k×m random matrix with each entry indipendent
and identically distributed with 0 mean and unit variance. R has a matrix
variate Gaussian distribution with mean matrix M = 0 and covariance matrix
Σ = Ik ⊗ In.6
• Y has a matrix variate Gaussian distribution with mean matrix M = 0 and
covariance matrix Σ = Ik ⊗ 1kXTX
The attacker will try to produce xˆi , with 1 ≤ i ≤ m− p, such that xˆi is a good
estimate of the undisclosed private record xi. In other words the attacker’s target is
to try to give an estimation of one of the records contained in Xn−p, given that he
knows the records in Xp and their randomly projected counterpart in Yp.
We now derive the MAP estimate of x given y = Rx and the known matrices
Xp and Yp
xˆMAP (y, θ) = arg max
x
fx|y,θ(x = x|
1√
k
Rx = y, 1√
k
RXp = Yp)
which can be simplified in
arg max
x
fx,y,θ(
1√
k
RX = Y )
where X = [xXp] and Y = [yYp].
We further suppose that the attacker has no other background knowledge about
the private data, so we can assume that θ = 0.
The previous result can be written as
arg max
x
fx,y(
1√
k
RX = Y ) =
arg max
x
f 1√
k
RZ|Z(
1√
k
RZ = Y |Z = X)fZ(Z = X)
If we assume that fZ is distributed uniformly over an interval, we finally get
xˆMAP (y) = arg max
x
f 1√
k
RZ|Z(
1√
k
RZ = Y |Z = X)
In [?, Theorem 5.3.8] is shown that the probability density function we obtained
has the following form
(2pi)−
1
2k(p+1)det( 1
k
X
T
X)−
1
2ketr{−12Y (
1
k
X
T
X)−1Y T }
We want to maximize this function in order to solve the problem of finding the best
estimate of x given the observation of Xp.
Liu proposes an algorithm to estimate the nondisclosed records of a certain
dataset. Experimental results have shown that while decreasing the number of column
records known to the attacker (denoted by p) the relative error of the estimation
6⊗ indicates the Kroenecker product of two matrices [?]
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increases. The error in the estimation increases also decreasing the dimensionality
of the projected subspace (denoted by k). In particular the algorithm uses the
Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm to find the optimal solution of the maximization
problem.
2.5.5 Experimental results
In this section, we present experimental results obtained on a dataset containing
information about 70000 cases of diabetes diagnosticated in 130 US hospitals during
the decade 1999-2008 [?] 7. From now on we will refer to this dataset as the diabetes
dataset.
We focus on the classification of patients based on their privatized data. Following
the work in [?, ?], we choose to use random forest classifier in our dataset to classify
the users. Moreover, from the work in [?], we know that random forest classifiers
works really well with random projections. In Figure ?? we report the effectiveness
in terms of accuracy running the random forest classifier [?] on the original data
and on the projected data in multiple lower dimensional spaces. To run and validate
the classification algorithm, we divided the whole dataset into two parts: train
and test. In the dataset we decided to predict the range of glucose level in the
blood. So that, the algorithm was firstly trained with the records within the train
part of the diabetes dataset, providing all the target values. Thus, we made the
random forest classifier algorithm predicts the target values in the test part giving
its features as input. Moreover, we tested the effectiveness of RPs also with k-nearest
neighbors (k-NN) classifier, the results were reported in Figure ??. Our approach
was inspired by [?]. The results are quite different because in the first experiment we
taken a feature of the dataset (the range of glucose level in the blood) as the value
to predict, instead with the second experiment we choose to run firstly a kMeans
clustering algorithm (on the whole dataset) to obtain labeled groups and then, with
the k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) classifier we predicted the values.
The blue line represents the accuracy of the machine learning algorithm on
the original data. The orange line, instead, represents the accuracy of the same
algorithm on the projected (obfuscated) data. We tested the classification algorithm
on projected spaces in different sizes, starting from only 2 components up to 10
components.
The lines plotted in Figure ?? presents the average values for each projection
space, while the vertical wiskers represent the confidence interval corresponding to a
specific projection space. For the baseline (classification on the clear data) we ran
the classification algorithm 50 times, in each round starting from a random state of
the random forest classifier. Since the original data is not projected into any space,
we have only a baseline with the associated mean value and confidence interval.
Thus, we reported the confidence interval only at the lefties part of line using wisker
again. Instead, for the accuracy of classification on the projected data, we ran the
algorithm more than 100 times. In each round the algorithm generated a value for
each projected space. The results were obtained using the scikit-learn package on
Python 3.6.
7The dataset is called “Diabetes 130-US hospitals for years 1999–2008 Data Set” and is available
at this page
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Figure 2.10. Accuracy of the random forest classifier algorithm on the original data
(blue line) and on the projected data (orange line), varying the projection space (#
of components). Mean values are reported as lines and 95% confidence intervals are
reported as vertical lines.
Figure 2.11. Accuracy of the k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) algorithm on the original data
(blue line) and on the projected data (orange line), varying the projection space (#
of components). Mean values are reported as lines and 95% confidence intervals are
reported as vertical lines.
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In [?, ?] the authors explore the security of such techniques: they show how it is
possible to use data dimensionality reduction techniques to lower the complexity of
data mining algorithms while preserving their accuracy and how those techniques
preserve the privacy of users.
The authors start from the same privacy hypothesis we have presented in ?? and
study how an attacker in possession of a collection of linearly independent private
data records and their corresponding transformed part can gather some insight about
other records.
We present the results we got running the algorithm of [?] on this dataset. After
choosing a number p of record pairs (xp, yp) we select a record x for which we do
not know the mapping; the algorithm we are using will try to give an estimation xˆ
of the original record x.
We used two techniques to evaluate how similar to the original records the
algorithm’s estimations were. We measured the distance between the estimation xˆ
provided by the algorithm and the original record x. We compute the relative error
between the two vectors with the following:
E(x, xˆ) = ||x− xˆ||2||x||2
The error E increases with the Euclidean distance between the two. Notice that
with this notation it may happen that the error is greater than one: this could verify
in the case that the distance between x and its estimations xˆ is high and the norm
of x is a small value. This could happen if the algorithm’s estimation is very far off
from the original record.
This measuring has the drawback to lack an upper bound for the dissimilarity.
Neither the cosine similarity helps, since in our case we are not interested only in
the direction of vectors but also in their magnitude.
A solution is provided in [?], where a radial basis function kernel can be used for
representing similarities: we are going to use 1 − 1
edist(x,xˆ)
as a similarity function
between x and its estimation xˆ, where dist(x, xˆ) = ||x − xˆ||2. The bigger the
Euclidean distance between two vectors, the bigger the error edist(x,xˆ) will be. In
this way we have a [0, 1) bound for the similarity of the estimations. By applying
the inverse we get a value in the range [0,1): if x and xˆ are the same vector (perfect
reconstruction performed by the algorithm) then 1
edist(x,xˆ) = 1.
Our workplan is the following: for every subspace of dimensionality k we apply
the algorithm with different knowledge about the number of pairs (xp, yp) the at-
tacker knows. We go from p = k − 1 to p = 1. In the next figures we display the
results of our experiments, with the two different measuring techniques we used to
quantify the similarity between the original records and the estimated ones. We
report the mean of the errors for every pair (k, p) and the variance. On the X axis
are placed the tuples (k, p) for which we have conducted the experiments, on the Y
axis we placed the reconstruction errors.
On low-dimensionality subspaces we get a high relative error, meaning that
it is not possible to give an effective approximation of the original (private) data
records. In higher dimensions the approximation is closer to the original data. We
2.5 Random projections and privacy 55
ran our experiments with 10 features of the dataset, since with vectors of higher
dimensionality it becomes more difficult to run the reconstruction algorithm in
reasonable times; also with higher dimensionalities the algorithm we are using
outputs vector reconstructions that are very dissimilar from the original ones.
We applied the random projection to reduce the feature space in different
dimensions, from 10 to 3. Notice, however, that even when the projected space has
the same dimension of the original space, we already get a significant relative error,
meaning that on the average it is not possible for the attacker to extrapolate any
useful information about the patients’ records. So for records of higher dimensionality
there is already a safe privacy bound when applying random projection to them, at
least against this kind of attacks.
We assigned an increasing numerical value to nominal features, that is, we
assigned 0 to the text male and 1 to text female in the gender feature.
We applied random projection to this records, from k = 10 (no dimensionality
reduction) to k = 3; the number p of pairs (original record, projected record) known
to the attacker is in the range k − 1 ≤ p ≤ 1.
With k = 2 we obviously have only p = 1: we omit this result since it is not
meaningful with respect the other results we get for higher k and p, because it does
not show how knowing less (or more) information about the original data changes
the reliability of the reconsturction we get.
Figure 2.12. Mean and variance of the relative error while using the formula ||x−xˆ||2||x||2
In the next figures we show the mean and variances of the errors for every tuple
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Figure 2.13. Mean and variance of the similarity between original records and their
reconstruction while using the similarity function 1− 1
e||x−xˆ||2
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(k, p) for which we have conducted the experiment. It can be seen from the charts
that as the number of known input-output pairs p decreases, the reconstruction error
increases. Together with the dimensionality reduction, disclosing a scarce number of
known input-output pairs can help with the task of preserving the privacy of users
involved in clinical trials.
In this case we are projecting low dimensionality vectors (k = 10) but we still get
high reconstruction errors when applying the techniques we have explained. This is
another confirmation of the thesis that random projections help keep the privacy of
users when their information is shared among research institutes.
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Chapter 3
Sensing and processing in low
power and wireless devices
In this chapter, we present the work done on refining an embedded solution thatsenses physical values, processes them and sends them to a sink (a gateway),achieving years of lifespan on batteries. Our first solution, the so-called MMS
[?, ?] was refined multiple times and posed the basis to the realization of the Re-
alTMS [?]. The RealTMS was used to validate the architecture presented in Chapter
?? and proved to be a capable device for IoHT applications.
One of the propellant that is fueling the vast deployment of the Internet of
Things (IoT) is the availability of inexpensive and inter-operative hardware. The
technology made impressive progresses during the last two decades and now it
reached the required level of miniaturization and low prices to take over the wider
audience. Among all, most of the devices composing the IoT can operate with limited
processing power, transmission bandwidth and energy. Thus, they can be deployed
in different environment and sometimes they will never require maintenance during
their entire life cycle (they will not need, for example, the changing of batteries,
reprogramming and so on).
We will particularly focus on this matter: the optimization of current state
of the art solutions to achieve long lasting operational state without maintenance.
This will allow the deployment of devices in the most challenging environment,
where the human interaction is strongly expensive or impractical. In the specific,
we investigated throughly the capabilities of current state of the art solutions to
efficiently use low energy power sources in order to achieve multiple functions, such
as sensing an environmental value, its local processing and the transmission of data
through multi-hop network up to a gateway.
The “sensing” action implies the interaction of an electronic device with the
environment, in order to transform a physical value to a digital one. Since real
world parameters are mostly analog values and modern systems are digitally based
electronic devices, they need to convert the environmental parameters to digital
values. Most of these conversions start from of a chemical or a physical reaction,
but at the end they are mostly evaluated as the changing of a capacitance or of
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a resistance. The Analog to Digital Converters (ADC) are specific circuits used
to achieve these conversions. The very action of converting an analog value to a
digital one requires a certain amount of energy, moreover there as some sensors that
requires the heating a small plate to sense a particular value (for example some
relative humidity sensors) or some other requires the forcing of air flow to sense the
amount of dust in the air, just to cite a few of them. All these operations require
energy, draining the batteries. One step further, an IoT device needs to “process”
the gathered values (for example to retrieve the dew point from temperature and
relative humidity) and it also uses processing power to handle the communication
protocol. This actions, again, consume energy. In the end, the device will send the
important data through a “wireless” link up to other devices. The proper action of
partecipating in communications requires energy, again, and communicating through
a wireless medium usually requires more energy.
We need to take care of all these actions in order to mantain the energy con-
sumption as low as possible, using possibly sophisticated solutions on both hardware
and software.
In this chapter, we present our work on designing, realizing and testing real
devices capable to operate for years without the need of battery replacement, repro-
gramming or any kind of human interaction. Despite some of the works illustrated
in the next sections aim to the Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) and, more
generally, the engineering structure monitoring, they posed the basis for our proof-
of-concept device used in the previous chapters. In fact, we took the design solutions
presented in this chapter and we used them in our dedicated device for IoHT. We
had to add some sensing components useful in clinical trials, like temperature and
relative humidity sensor and shock/vibration sensor. The hardware used in the
previous chapter (the RealTMS) is also more powerful than the one introduced here,
and can accomplish asymmetric key encryption.
IoHT devices often need to use low power techniques. For example, the widely
used “holter” devices run for more than a whole day measuring heartrate, pressure
or other biometrical values. Wearables devices capable of sensing heart rate, sleep
cycles and so on uses low power techniques in order to operate for days without
recharging or changing batteries. While the very action of “changing batteries” seems
in contrast to the effort described above (“totally removing maintenance”), we need
to take into account the functions that a specific devices must do. For example it is
possible to make an activity band that senses heart rate to last months, but instead
of measuring the heart rate every ten seconds, it will sense heart rate every two
hours. In the following, the concept called “duty cycle” will be explained in details.
3.1 A Modular Design for Wireless Structural Health
Monitoring Applications
In this section we present the Modular Monitoring System (MMS), a low-power
wireless architecture dedicated to Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) applications.
Our solution features an easily customizable modular architecture, fulfilling the
needs of many SHM applications. The MMS supports mesh network topology
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and offers excellent coverage and reliability, taking advantage of Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN) technology. Later in this same section we present the research and
development activity made on the MMS.
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) deals with the detection of damages to
which civil and industrial structures, such as roads, bridges, canals, buildings and
aero-space vehicles are subjected to. It can prevent collapses and breaks, avoiding
permanent damages to structures, thus simplifying and improving the effectiveness
of their maintenance. Depending on application scenarios, SHM requires many
different types of sensors, including pressure sensors, vibrating-wire strain gauges,
inclinometers, crackmeters, etc.
Nowadays, most SHM systems in the market are wired. However, the deployment
of a wired system in a wide area or in a harsh environment, can pose both economical
and practical limitations. For this reasons, WSNs have been proposed as an ad-hoc
network infrastructure to support SHM, avoiding prohibitive costs of wired systems
and easing the on-field deployment. Nowadays, SHM supported by WSN is an active
and well-established research field and some wireless SHM systems are now entering
the market. The work presented in this chapter introduces the MMS, a wireless,
low-power, scalable hardware architecture dedicated to SHM. A key feature of the
MMS is its high modularity that allows easy customization of the platform depending
on the number and the type of sensors required by the specific application scenario.
In addition, MMS fully supports multi-hop wireless communication paradigm and
mesh networks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section ?? presents the
state-of-the-art on both wired and wireless SHM systems. In Section ?? we explain
the motivations supporting the design choices made during the development of the
MMS, while in Section ?? we introduce the features characterizing our system. In
Section ??, we present the hardware prototype while in section ?? we report tests
and validation results.
3.2 State of the art
Nowadays, most SHM systems available on the market, such as the Geomonitor by
Solexperts [?], are wired. However, deploying those systems can be cumbersome:
besides the installation costs, a detailed deployment plan is required to face evolving
needs of different construction phases. Moreover, cables are subjected to accidental
cuts and damages and, in some scenarios, their installation is infeasible or inappro-
priate (e.g., historical buildings). Along with wired systems, some standalone data
loggers dedicated to SHM are commercially available, among the others: Solexperts
SDL [?], Geokon 8002-16-1 [?] and Keller GSM-2 [?]. These systems are simpler
to install, but they do not allow real-time remote monitoring and require frequent
in-situ access by qualified personnel to collect data.
The introduction of wireless communications in SHM gives immediate advantages in
terms of easier deployments and reduced maintenance and personnel costs. However,
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when monitoring devices are battery-powered, the use of wireless communications
is among the most energy demanding feature that can significantly limit the de-
vices lifetime. Prominent examples of wireless monitoring systems are: National
Instruments Wireless Data Acquisition (WiFi-DAQ) [?] and MicroStrain’s wireless
sensor network [?]. While the former supports IEEE 802.11 standard, the latter is
compliant with IEEE 802.15.4. Both products adopt a conservative approach by
limiting wireless communication to 1-hop. Supporting multi-hop wireless commu-
nications was investigated in several research papers in the last decade [?, ?, ?].
Multi-hop networking provides a number of advantages: scalability (larger areas can
be covered), reliability (failure and multiple routing paths without single point of
failure) and ease of deployments (the presence of multi-hop relay nodes allows to
bypass obstacles like walls and metal structures). Recently, National Instruments
presented the NI WSN [?]: a multi-hop battery-powered WSN supporting up to 36
nodes configured in a mesh network and up to 3 years node lifetime.
3.3 Motivations
As seen in the previous section, WSNs are slowly entering the market of SHM appli-
cations. An attempt to develop a robust solution and to test it in realistic application
scenarios was made in the GENESI Project [?]. The main goal of that project was
to design and implement a “novel generation of green wireless sensor networks which
can be embedded in buildings and infrastructures at the time of construction and
be able to provide a monitoring and control intelligence over the whole structure
lifetime”. The project involved the monitoring of a bridge construction site in Fri-
bourg [?] and the construction of a tunnel for the B1 underground line in Rome [?],
by means of WSNs. The outcomes of these experimental activities, highlighted the
advantages of WSN technology compared to old monitoring techniques. According
to the application requirements provided by the SHM experts, GENESI nodes can
support a number of heterogeneous sensors. However, a GENESI node can manage
only a single sensor per type, while there are some applications in which multiple
instances of the same sensor are needed. As an example, in a 3-axis deformation
analysis, a single wireless node may need to interface with three instances of a
vibrating-wire strain gauge while to monitor a concrete junction the node may need
to interface a current-loop inclinometer sensor and a resistive displacement sensor.
Other commercial solutions, such as the NI WSN described in Section ??, can handle
multiple instances of the same sensor but can not support different sensor families
at the same time. In general, the development of new ad-hoc devices addressing
the specific requirements of an SHM deployment is impractical, while the adoption
of commercial solutions in such contexts is not optimal in terms of flexibility, size
and costs. This brought us to propose a novel low-power slotted modular system
made by a set of modules connected through an internal communication bus. This
solution features one wireless master module managing a group of extension modules,
each one designed to interface a specific sensor set. The flexibility of the proposed
architecture, named MMS, allows us to support a vast number of SHM applications
by simply plugging into each node the required extension modules. By changing
the master module, it is also possible to easily modify the wireless technology, thus
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effectively adapting to the heterogeneous needs of indoor and outdoor communication
requirements.
3.4 System architecture
The original MMS architecture presented in [?] was based on a master/slave com-
munication abstraction where “a master module, provided with radio capability and
responsible for most of computational tasks, communicates through a low-power
shared bus with a maximum of four extension modules (slaves)”. The new architec-
ture embraces the same principle but requires the design of a new low-power shared
bus.
The low-power shared bus in [?] was based on the Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
Protocol with dedicated Chip Select (CS) and interrupt lines for each module. The
rationale for this choice was to minimize the power consumption of the whole platform
by allowing the master module to selectively activate each extension module acting
on the corresponding chip select line, thus, without affecting the power consumption
of the other modules installed on the platform. Despite the effectiveness of such
solution from the power consumption perspective, the elevated number of dedicated
lines (2 shared lines for the power supply, 3 shared lines for the SPI and 2 dedicated
lines, CS and interrupt, for each extension module) forced us to develop a backplane
board with a pre-defined number of slots at design time. In the original release,
shown in figure ??, we chose to support one master module and 4 extension modules,
as a good trade-off between size and modularity.
Figure 3.1. First version of the Modular Architecture.
This choice quickly revealed its limits: the additional backplane board increased
the overall size of the platform and its costs for the electronics, and it also required
extra costs for the ad-hoc housing. To overcome these limits we took hints from
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existing modular housing solutions available on the market and we updated our
design as described below. We found out that most of the considered modular
products are based on O type DIN rail standard [?], a widely used solution for
mounting circuit breakers and industrial control equipment inside racks. To ease
the communication between modules, such solutions commonly provide a 5 lines
shared bus. Hence, we implemented our system in a modular DIN housing and we
redesigned the low-power shared bus to be compliant with the reduced number of
lines offered by DIN bus. This led us to the new MMS architecture described in the
following sections.
Figure 3.2. New Modular Architecture.
3.4.1 Low-Power Shared Bus
The availability of only 5 shared lines in the bus drastically reduces the implementa-
tion options for a master/multi-slave communication system. Excluding power and
ground lines, the low-power shared bus has to be implemented on the remaining
3 shared lines. To overcome this constraint, we used the Inter Integrated Circuit
protocol (I2C) which is a multi-master/multi-slave serial communication protocol
based on two open-drain lines bus [?]. The communication protocol, which is master
initiated, is based on the transmission of a 7 bit address, i.e., the slave address to
which the master wants to communicate, followed by a read/write bit and a set of
protocol dependent commands. The third open-drain shared line has been used by
the extension modules to trigger the master to start a communication. The master
module polls to slaves to identify which extension module triggered the interrupt on
the third line. Figure ?? shows the new architecture with a detailed view of the new
low-power shared bus implementation.
This new solution easily scales with the number of extension modules (the
standard implementation of the I2C bus is designed to support up to 127 devices),
thus increasing the flexibility and optimizing the size of the MMS. However, from
the power consumption perspective, we need to pay attention to several drawbacks:
• Wake-up. When the master module issues an I2C start command, all the
extension modules wake up to perform the address matching, even if the
communication is addressed to one module only.
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• Polling. When an extension module starts a communication, it notifies the
master using the interrupt line. Subsequently the master polls all the devices
to find the initiator.
• Latency. The I2C protocol needs more data to be sent over the bus with
respect to the SPI one, this increases the latency and the power consumption
of the MMS.
In section ?? we analyzed each of these aspects measuring the power consumption
overhead related to this new implementation with respect to the original low-power
shared bus. The results show that the overall consumption of the MMS is marginally
affected by this choice.
3.4.2 Master Module
As in the first version of the MMS, the master module is responsible for managing the
wireless connectivity within the WSN and manages the extension modules. When
switched on, the master performs a discovery routine for dynamically assign the I2C
addresses to each extension modules and to retrieve the configuration information
from them. Then, the master computes the sensing schedule and switches to the
operational mode. Below a typical master-initiated interaction with the extension
module is described:
1. The master issues an I2C start command over the bus and sends the address
of the extension module followed by a write bit and a data request command.
2. The extension module wakes-up and starts the conversion while the master
enters a low-power state, waiting for an interrupt.
3. The master wakes up when an extension module pulls down the interrupt line.
4. The master polls all the modules searching for the initiator.
5. When found, the master sends a Data Read command to retrieve the new
data.
6. When the read finishes the extension module puts the interrupt line in high
impedance and enters sleep state again.
7. The master module checks the interrupt line level for other extension module
that are willing to communicate. If the line is still low, it jumps to step 4
otherwise it goes back to sleep.
3.4.3 Extension Module
The extension modules provide the hardware interface to external sensors. Each
module communicates over the low-power shared bus with the master by means of an
I2C-capable microcontroller. When powered-on, the extension modules participate
to the I2C address assignment managed by the master module. Once an extension
module gets an address, it switches to a sleep state and wakes up only upon the
detection of an I2C start command on the bus. The extension module can initiate a
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communication by pulling down the shared interrupt line of the low-power shared
bus, which activates the polling procedure by the master.
Each extension module provides a register configuration area that enables the
interaction with the master module. The register area is divided in 5 subsections as
follows:
• The Information area [read-only] stores information such as device type
and revision. This area allows the master to identify the extension module,
e.g., sensors supported, channels available, etc.
• The Command area [write-only] is used by the master to trigger commands
to the extension module such as a read command.
• The Settings area [read/write] stores settings for each sensor channel such
as the sensor type connected, the periodic sampling value, etc.
• The Channel flags area [read-only] is used by the extension module to
notify that a new data is available.
• The Channels data area [read-only] is used by the extension module to
store the last sensor value read.
An example of extension module register implemented on our test board is shown in
table ??.
The hardware interface provided by each module depends on the sensors it
supports: it can be fully digital, e.g., to interface RS-232 or RS-485 peripherals,
or analog, to connect sensors such as current-loop, vibrating wire strain gauges,
resistive etc. Each extension module can support different kinds of sensors or several
sensors of the same type.
3.4.4 Power Module
The modular design of the new MMS allows us to support a number of interchangeable
power modules which provide the power supply to the whole MMS through the
power line on the bus. The modules support any kind of battery type providing a
voltage between 3 and 5.5V as well as the 240V AC and energy harvesting solutions.
Notice that this flexibility was not possible in the previous release of the MMS, since
the power unit had to be integrated into the backplane at design time.
3.4.5 Additional extensions
We introduced the interlink bus which enables the MMS to support a virtually
unlimited number of extension modules. In the specific, it connects the master
modules of different MMS creating a tree structure where the parent MMS acts as
master for its children.
To do so, the parent MMS uses the extension slots to make a connection through
the interlink plugs of its children (see Figure ??). Hence, the parent sees its children
as enhanced extension modules. This mechanism can be replicated at each level of
the tree to support an unlimited number of sensors. Each leaf node advertises the
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Table 3.1. Extension module register area example.
Address Register
0x00 Device type
0x02 Device description
0x03 Cmd channel 0
0x04 Cmd channel 1
0x05 Cmd channel 2
0x06 Cmd channel 3
0x07 Configuration channel 0
0x0e Configuration channel 1
0x17 Configuration channel 2
0x1f Configuration channel 3
0x27 Data flag channel 0
0x28 Data flag channel 1
0x29 Data flag channel 2
0x2a Data flag channel 3
0x2b Data channel 0
0x3b Data channel 1
0x4b Data channel 2
0x5b Data channel 3
Figure 3.3. Interlink connections
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connected sensors together with its identification number to its parent which aggre-
gates the received information and forwards it to the upper level. This procedure
is iterated until the root MMS is reached. The root MMS is the only one which
manages wireless communications. From a WSN perspective, this makes the whole
tree resulting as a single wireless node.
Thanks to the discovery procedure performed by the master during the boot phase,
extension modules attached to the backplane exchange configuration information.
Hence, an operator can add an extension module at any time by just power-cycling
the MMS, without the need of an in-situ reprogramming. This feature eases the effort
required by operators and qualified personnel. Based on our on-field experience, this
functionality is often required in evolving environments, such as (but not limited to)
SHM scenarios.
3.5 Hardware and firmware development
We designed, developed and assembled all the versions of the MMS at the Department
of Computer, Control and Management Engineering of the University of Rome “La
Sapienza”. The the first version (shown in figure ??) included a master module,
a Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) extension module and a backplane.
The modules are plugged into the backplane by a standard Peripheral Component
Interconnect Express (PCIe) edge connector.
Instead, the new version includes one master module, two demo extension mod-
ules and two power modules. As opposed to the first prototype, this version fits in a
complete modular housing solution based on pluggable slots and snap-in connections
for external sensors (figure ??). The whole system was housed in a steel IP66
enclosure with a mounted DIN rail, an external antenna and IP66 cable glands.
Due to scarce of time, the MMS has some limitations. We suggest the development
of several additional extension modules able to support most of the sensors used in
SHM, such as strain wire gauges, crack meters, inclinometers, displacement sensors,
etc. and additional master modules capable to support multiple wireless frequencies
(e.g., 433Mhz, 868Mhz, 915Mhz) and certified industrial wireless protocols like
Wireless Hart.
3.5.1 Master Module
The master module is responsible for radio communication and for managing the
extension modules. It is based on the MagoNode OEM [?], a wireless hardware
platform specifically designed for WSN applications. The MagoNode is based
on the Atmel Atmega128RFA1 (RFA1) System-On-Chip microcontroller (MCU)
equipped with 128KB of ROM (Read Only Memory), 16KB of RAM (Random
Access Memory) and an embedded 2.4Ghz radio transceiver fully compliant with
the 802.15.4 standard. The radio range is extended through a power efficient RF
(Radio Frequency) front-end which enhances radio performance while keeping the
power consumption low. The main figures in terms of power consumption are: radio
3.5 Hardware and firmware development 69
Figure 3.4. The old MMS with a master module, a RTD module and the interconnecting
backplane.
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Figure 3.5. The newest version of MMS with a power module, a master module and two
extension modules.
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transmission 27.7mA @+10dBm, radio reception 14.5mA and <2µA in sleep. The
master module is equipped with a NOR flash for persistent data storage, three status
leds, a mini-usb plug and an RP-SMA (Reverse Polarity SubMiniature version A)
antenna connector. An optional wireless HART [?] communication module can be
installed based on application requirements.
The firmware is written using TinyOS [?], an event-driven, open-source operating
system (OS) dedicated to Wireless Sensor Networks. TinyOS is designed to cope
with typical constraints imposed by Wireless Sensor Networks: low computational
capabilities, limited memory and scarce energy resources. TinyOS also provides a
set of libraries implementing low-power wireless protocols for medium access control
and routing. The implementation of the MMS firmware on TinyOS allows an easy
and effective integration of our system in large-scale WSNs deployments.
3.5.2 Demo Extension Module
We developed a general-purpose extension module for demo applications which
provides 4 24-bit analog channels, 2 excitation current outputs and 2 external
voltage references. The device logic is handled by an efficient ARM Cortex M0+
MCU. The MCU provides the I2C hardware interface and the interrupt channel
required by the low-power shared bus communication, an SPI interface for the 24-bit
ADC and a set of General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) pins for driving the 3
status leds of the module. As opposed to the first MMS prototype which could
switch off the power of the extension modules, in this case the low-power shared
bus has an always-on power line. This forces all the extension modules to remain
(by default) in a sleep mode when inactive: they are enabled only when an address
match event on the I2C peripheral occurs. The demo extension module supports
a sleep mode with a current consumption of 1.5µA1. As the master module, the
firmware was implemented using the TinyOS operating system which provides the
primitives for I2C and SPI communication and for handling the sleep mode of the
device.
3.5.3 Power Module
We currently support two basic power modules: an AA and D type 3.6V thionyl
chloride battery. A module to power the MMS via the 240V AC is in an advanced
development stage and we are also working on the integration of an energy harvesting
module supporting solar cells.
3.6 Experiments
In our experiments of the new MMS design, we first measured the power consumption
during a local data acquisition (i.e., with wireless radio disabled), then we evaluated
the system in a Wireless Sensor Network testbed. The former measurement vali-
dates the effectiveness of the low-power design in our architecture, while the latter
demonstrates how the MMS features energy consumption levels suited for WSN
1An errata specific to the MCU revision used in the extension module avoided to reach this value
which refers to the newest chip revisions.
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applications. Finally, we performed a set of measurements aimed to demonstrate
how the energy consumption overhead introduced by the new design of the MMS
(see section ??) is negligible if compared to the overall system consumption.
3.6.1 Local Data Measurement
All the measurements were done powering the MMS system with a Rigol DP1308A
programmable DC power supply, providing 3.0V . The MMS was connected in series
to a Rigol DM3068 digital multimeter that sampled the current consumption at
10kHz. The measurements were taken from an MMS made of a master module
and a single demo extension module connected to a displacement sensor, i.e., a
potentiometer with 4kΩ series resistance. We performed a single master-initiated
sampling request which consists in the following steps:
1. The master module sends the address of the extension module and sets a bit
in the command area register to trigger one sample from a single channel on
the selected extension module.
2. The extension module starts the conversion while the master goes back to
sleep waiting for an interrupt.
3. The extension module generates an interrupt to the master notifying that it
has a new data sample available.
4. The master polls all the modules, reading the data flag area. Whenever a flag
notifies new data available, the master retrieves the new data.
In a second experiment, we repeated the same procedure using an additional demo
extension module connected to an identical transducer where the master performs
a sample request from each module. The current consumption of both tests are
shown in figure ??. The data conversion time, which is equal to 50ms, is determined
by the sampling rate of the ADC which was configured to 20 samples per second.
As expected, the current consumption during data conversion is doubled in the
two extension modules configuration since each module performs the conversion at
almost the same time. In addition, it is clearly visible how the sample request and
data retrieval phases last twice in the two extension modules configuration since the
master module needs to perform these activities sequentially for both modules. In
both MMS setups, the system automatically switches back to sleep mode as soon as
the data retrieval phase is completed.
Table ?? summarizes the average current and energy consumption of each
phase measured on both configurations. Note that for the two extension modules
configuration there are overlapping effects between phases: when the master module
sends the start conversion command to the second extension module, the first module
is already converting. Similarly, during the data retrieval phase, when the master
module starts to download the new data from the first module, the second one is still
converting. This explains the differences in the average current consumption during
the sample request and data retrieval phases of the two modules configuration with
respect to the single one.
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Table 3.2. Local measurement - consumption details.
Single ext. module Double ext. modules
State Avg current(mA)
Energy
(µJ )
Avg current
(mA)
Energy
(µJ )
Sleep 0.0035 N/A 0.005 N/A
Sample request 3.65 28 5.23 67
Data conversion 1.69 281 3.36 543
Data retrieval 2.79 104 3.57 178
Total 1.95 413 3.51 788
Figure 3.6. MMS current consumption during local data acquisition.
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3.6.2 WSN testbed
We tested the two extension module configuration, described in the previous section,
in an indoor wireless sensor network deployment located at the basement of our
department. The testbed setup (figure ??), consisted in 10 IRIS wireless devices [?]
building a multi-hop wireless sensor network together with the MMS. Each IRIS
mote was configured to generate one packet of 88 bytes every minute and to transmit
it over the network. The MMS was set to locally sample one channel from each
extension module generating 2 sensor readings every minute in order to transmit
the sampled data over the wireless medium at the same rate as the IRIS motes. All
data packets are routed through the multi-hop network toward a gateway, which is
responsible for data aggregation and storing. We used the Collection Tree Protocol
[?] as routing algorithm and the BoX-MAC medium access control protocol [?], both
provided by the TinyOS operating system. To save energy, the MAC protocol was
set with a radio duty cycle of 2% which represents a common value when long lasting
wireless sensor networks are deployed. The testbed ran for 5 hours and collected
statistical information embedded in the packets transmitted every minute by each
node.
Table ?? reports detailed power consumption statistics, averaged over all the IRIS
motes and compared with the one of the MMS. We observe that the power consump-
tion of the MMS is similar to the one of the IRIS motes. Despite these measurements
strongly depend on the position of the MMS in the network topology, this similarity
shows that our solution is comparable in terms of energy requirements to a common
WSN platform. Furthermore, the energy consumption of the sampling activity is less
than 1% of the overall consumption that is largely dominated by the radio activity.
We are aware that different transducers (e.g., the current-loop family) can consume
more energy during conversion. This would significantly impact the fraction of
energy consumed by the sampling activity. However, this consumption is exclusively
related to the adopted transducer and does not depend on our architecture.
Table 3.3. Testbed - consumption details.
State MMS Platform IRIS Platform (AVG)
Energy Sleep (J) 0.26 0.13
Energy Radio Tx (J) 4.56 4.79
Energy Radio Rx (J) 1.23 1.28
Energy Radio Idle (J) 19.84 25.65
Energy Sampling (J) 0.23 0
Total 26.13 31.85
3.6.3 Design Overhead
As discussed in section ??, we adopted a new design for the low-power shared bus,
increasing the flexibility and reducing the cost of the MMS. However, these advantages
come at the expense of a higher management complexity of the system that caused an
increase of the power consumption. Obviously, the higher is the number of extension
modules, the higher is the complexity, thus the power consumption overhead increases
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Figure 3.7. Testbed map.
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accordingly. In this section, we evaluate the overhead of the new MMS design in
terms of power consumption when compared to the original design.
Wake-up, polling and latency are the three main factors that cause the consump-
tion overhead. We consider a configuration made of a master module and 4 extension
modules performing a local measurement cycle as the one described in section ?? to
measure the contribution of each of those factors to the overall power consumption.
Wake-up
When the master module starts an I2C communication, it writes on the bus the
address of the module it wants to communicate with. This activity wakes up all
the extension modules that start an address matching procedure. Thanks to the
new architecture of the M0+ MCU of the extension modules, the address matching
procedure is carried out only employing the I2C peripheral integrated in the chip,
without the need to awake the MCU (this mode is called sleepwalking [?]). This
feature wakes up the MCU only upon an address match event, reducing the overall
power consumption of the address matching procedure. At the standard I2C
100kbit/s datarate, the address transmission requires 90µs. Assuming 3.0V and
50µA current consumption of the sleepwalking peripheral, the energy required by
an extension module to perform an address matching procedure on the low-power
shared bus is 14nJ. Considering that for each request there are 3 extension modules
that do not match the address, the overall energy wasted for each request is 42nJ.
Polling
The master module polls each extension module by looking at the data flag area
which notifies whenever a new data is available. On the low-power shared bus this
operation is performed as in figure ??: the master first send a write request followed
by the register address of the data flag area and successively a read request. The
extension module replies with the content of the data flag area and, if no data is
available, the communication ends. The whole procedure, which is 8 bytes long, is
performed in 840µs on a standard 100kbit/s datarate I2C channel. The measured
current consumption of the MMS during a polling procedure is 4mA that, assuming
3.0V supply, brings to an energy of 10.1µJ per extension module. In the configuration
under test, there are 3 polled extension modules over 4 that do not provide new
samples, hence, the wasted energy is 30.3µJ .
Latency
We observed that the new design of the low-power shared bus requires, on average,
6 additional control bits each 10 data bits transmitted with the old implementation.
This constraint increases latency in communications and, in turn, power consumption.
The reason why more control bits are needed relies on the more complex I2C bus
management compared to the SPI protocol used by the old design. Assuming a
local data measurement procedure as the one described in section ??, the protocol
transmits 6 additional control bytes. Considering 4mA current consumption of I2C
communication, 3.0V supply and a standard 100 kbit/s I2C datarate, the additional
energy for each extension module measurement introduced by latency is 5.8µJ.
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Note that we are not considering the latency introduced by the different supported
datarates of each protocol since it is limited by noise immunity requirements.
Based on these measurements, the overall energy overhead of the low power shared
bus in a local measurement procedure is 36.14µJ which represents a consumption
overhead of 9% when compared to the overall energy consumption measured in
a single extension module configuration of table ??. Recalling that the sampling
activity accounts for less than 1% of the overall energy consumption of the MMS, we
can conclude that the energy overhead of the new MMS design is totally negligible.
Figure 3.8. Polling I2C communication detail.
3.7 Low power monitoring device for IoHT applications
Starting from the technology shown in the previous sections, we decided to design
and implement a low power board for IoHT applications. We know from Section ??
that ideally the personal health information should be encrypted from the source
of data (thus, from the lowest level devices) and we also know that these devices
must be as low power as possible. Since we wanted as much control as possible on
both hardware and software, we decided to realize by ourselves the device shown in
Figure ??, called “RealTMS”.
The RealTMS measures about 5cm by 7cm and it is powered by two alkaline
batteries type AA that guarantee long lasting operation. The heart of the device is
an ARM Cortex-M4 ore-based microcontroller with 32 bits architecture clocked at
80MHz. It also integrates a DSP (Digital Signal Processing unit), 128kB of RAM and
1MB of flash memory and some advanced low power capabilities (like low power timer
and low power UART interface - Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter). It
is produced by ST Microelectronics (the exact model is STM32L476RG). We also
added on-board sensors for: temperature, relative humidity, 3-axial linear accelera-
tion, 3-axial angular velocity and 3-axial magnetic field sensor. These sensors are
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Figure 3.9. RealTMS
MEMS (Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems). The temperature and relative humidity
sensor is produced by Sensirion (model SHT25) and has excellent performances:
about two tenth of Celsius degree accuracy and 1.8% accuray in relative humidity
measurement. It comes fully calibrated from factory. The 3-axial sensor for lineal
accelerations, angular velocities and magnetic fields is the MPU9250 (produced by
InvenSense) that integrates a complete IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) within a
single chip. The radio interface is provided by the NRF24L01+ chip produced by
Nordic Semiconductor and is one of the cheapest radio chip available. It operates in
the ISM (Industrial, Scientific and Medical) radio band at a frequency of 2.4GHz.
Additionally, a slot for microSD card is provided in the need to store a very large
amount of data to further processing.
The MCU (microcontroller) selected is supported by many operative systems
for embedded systems, such as FreeRTOS, RiotOS, Mbed OS and more. In our
application we used RiotOS firstly, then switched to FreeRTOS. The sensors on-board
and the processing power of the MCU allow for complex activity recognition with
the integrated DSP, such as walking, falling and many more. The temperature
and relative humidity sensor permits a precise monitoring of the surrondings and
produces high quality data that is possible to exploit for further processing.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
In an increasingly data-driven world, where information sharing, machine learn-ing, and social networking leads the way, the IoT will be a key technology forperson-centric mobile eHealth. This work looks into the usage of IoT technolo-
gies as an integral part of clinical trials so that data residing in an IoT world can
enable drug developers to get better insights and streamline the overall clinical trial
processes. The digital clinical trial assumed moves beyond existing solutions that
follow a simplistic approach by limiting to the connection of patients to trials that
they might be interested in. The study carefully examines the privacy issues that
arise throughout all the phases of a Digital Clinical Trial and examines the pertinent
security requirements.
The dominant approach for the delivery of IoT ecosystems is providing the
majority of the services within cloud-based infrastructures. Consider for example
the well established fitness applications1,2 that use a smart band or smart watches
to monitor users’ physiological data (e.g., heart rate). It is evident that cloud-based
IoT platforms simplify the interconnection of smart devices, the collection of data
generated to the cloud, and the central processing of the information utilizing other
cloud-based services. However, transmitting confidential data to cloud-based services
and storing them over third-party infrastructure poses significant risks for the privacy
of users. In principle, the only two entities that should handle the data of a clinical
trial are the patient, the provider of personal data, and the clinical research institute,
the consumer of the data provided by the community of patients participating in
the clinical trial. In this dissertation, several approaches have been presented to
deliver systems that enable the secure exchange of data between the two parties (i.e.,
patients and clinical research institutes) even when other third parties are involved.
This work aims to protect confidentiality by controlling disclosure of private
data. However, this protection may turn out to be insufficient in the light of
predictive techniques such as data mining: not only should data be protected but
the predictions mined out of these data, i.e., data patterns should be filtered too to
forbid their mischievous use as the possession of data patterns and a few medical
data about someone may allow to predict part of their medical future and treat
1https://www.fitbit.com/
2https://www.strava.com/
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them accordingly [?].
We applied a random-projection (RP) approach to privacy-preserving data mining
of medical data, demonstrating the usefulness of RP in increasing privacy of personal
health data handling. The projected data are useful for machine learning algorithms
(for example, in clustering) while allows the sharing of information between parties
without revealing the patients’ clear data. In this particular application, this is
of notable importance since allows entities involved in different health branches to
cooperate effectively without sharing clear data. Second, we investigated to what
extent an attacker can discover additional information starting from leaked data.
As long as the projected space is smaller than the original space, and as long as the
amount of data leaked is small, than the proposed approach is robust and mantains
very good performance in both accuracy and privacy. We also analyzed the ratio
behind and the performances (in terms of accuracy) of the RP applied on sensible
healthcare data. The results show that the use of RP offers great enhancements in
privacy protection. This was a first step into developing a full-fledged platform that
allows the effective share of medical data. A proof-of-concept implementation was
provided to evaluate the proposed technical solutions and their performance within
a complex distributed system. The results indicated that by suitably combining
blockchain and IoT technologies it is possible to design a digital clinical trial.
In the Chapter ??, we presented the initial realization and the further devel-
opments of the Modular Monitoring System, a novel low-power wireless modular
architecture designed for SHM applications. Our platform, the MMS, takes advan-
tage of a low-power shared bus connecting slotted extension modules that interact
with a master in a master/slave communication abstraction. The extension modules,
which can be combined as needed, allows the MMS to face the continuously evolving
needs of most SHM scenarios. Thanks to its peculiar characteristics, the MMS over-
comes commercial state-of-the-art WSN solutions for SHM, like the NI WSN, which
do not offer enough flexibility to fulfill requirements of many application contexts
in a both cost-effective and efficient way. The newest implementation overcomes
the size and costs issues of the first prototype presented in [?] offering an improved
architecture based on DIN standard modular housing. This solution also offers an
increased flexibility by supporting interchangeable power sources. We validated
the effectiveness of the system low-power design, performing energy measurements
during data acquisition from actual transducers. In addition, we tested the MMS
within a real WSN deployment, to demonstrate the compliance of the system in
such applications.
In the last Section ?? of the previous chapter we introduced the RealTMS, the
embedded system that we refined in order to validate the architecture presented in
Chapter ??. It proved to be capable in handling low power task and signing packet
involved in a digital clinical trials scenarios. However the lack of specific sensor for
biometrical data (such as heart rate, blood pressure and other) and the size strongly
limited its possible applications.
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As future work, we suggest to incorporate techniques such as data randomisation
in combination with data mining methods, thus limiting the accuracy of the results
provided. This action will build stronger basis in enabling access to the private data
without violating the privacy of individuals, while allowing to exploit its full potential.
Moreover, we suggest to run an audit to check privacy protection against real third
parties. Our device, the RealTMS, can greatly benefit from further miniaturization
effort, in order to become a seemless wearable. It is strongly suggested to add more
sensors on-board, such as heart rate, pulse oximetry and other. This will allow to
retrieve better insights about the health of the patients.

